An o without a figure : King Lear and the mask of the fool by Traub, Miranda Jane
 
 
 
 
 
“An O without a figure”: 
 
King Lear and the Mask of the Fool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
 
Graduate Studies and Research 
 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of Master of Arts 
 
in the Department of English 
 
University of Saskatchewan 
 
Saskatoon 
 
 
 
By 
 
Miranda Jane Traub 
 
 
© Copyright Miranda Jane Traub, September 2004. All rights reserved. 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
a Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that 
the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for 
inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in 
any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted 
by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in 
their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College 
in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or 
publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall 
not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that 
due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of 
Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in 
my thesis.  
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in 
this thesis in whole or part should be addressed to:  
Head of the Department of English                  
University of Saskatchewan                               
320 Arts Tower         
             9 Campus Drive        
                        Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 
 
 
i. 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the topical abundance or superabundance of Shakespeare’s King 
Lear, almost all major thematic patterns, images, and symbols are linked 
to Lear’s enigmatic companion, the Fool. The Fool surpasses 
Shakespeare’s other fools when he is given a major role, yet he is more 
than a major figure: he is the pivot for action and interpretation. The 
presence and the importance of the Fool are emphasized further when 
almost half of Lear’s characters are referred to as fools. The stark, 
barren hinterland of Lear is shot through by the conspicuously forceful 
presence of folly.  
The fool’s propensity for misrule coupled with his centrality to the 
text results in a dramatic structure that itself breaks the rules. King Lear 
is the most generically puzzling play in Shakespeare’s corpus. Lear, a 
tragedy, draws upon comedy, history, romantic comedy, romance, and 
morality in indefinable and unparalleled ways. Just as form is juxtaposed 
in Lear, religious systems or identities are also contrasted. Pagan, 
Christian, existential, nihilistic, and moralistic interpretations are readily 
discernable. The fool, a potential nexus for structural questions, may 
also be at the heart of the question of spiritual identity. To locate the 
fool at the source of both structural and spiritual problems, and to 
discern why the fool factors so prominently especially in a play viewed as 
Shakespeare’s darkest, are the two endeavours of this thesis. 
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v. 
PREFACE 
 
 
In the final stages of the project’s completion, I saw the need for a 
brief explanatory note on this thesis’ form. Mikhail Bakhtin offers a starting 
point for this task.  
Bakhtin writes that the fool occupies a certain space between 
seemingly disparate categories:  
Clown fools represented a certain form of life which was real and ideal 
at the same time. They stood borderline between life and art, in a 
peculiar midzone, as it were; they were neither eccentrics nor dolts, 
neither were they comedic actors. (Rabelais 8) 
 
The notion of the midzone is important. Just as the clown fool occupies a 
midzone between certain categories such as life and art, this thesis also 
attempts to occupy a midzone and to draw upon both intellectual and 
creative or intuitive spheres in such a way that synchronizes content and 
form. In other words, this thesis written on the fool is also written in the 
spirit of the fool. For this reason, and for reasons of economy, I have had 
to limit certain critical discussions and focus only on the most relevant, 
though minute, details from the larger critical works. 
 
 
 
   
vi. 
  
 
“This great stage of fools” 
 
 
The landscape of Shakespeare’s King Lear excludes nothing. In the 
most intense way, this play anticipates Rainer Maria Rilke’s imperative 
to hold fast to life’s contradictions: “Deine ausgeübten Kräfte spanne, 
/ bis sie reichen, zwischen zwein / Widersprüchen” (13-15).1 Lear 
knows—is almost the definition of—contradiction: sublimity and 
absurdity, chaos and order, darkness and light, Love and Strife are 
juxtaposed in the strangest and yet most realistic ways. In keeping 
with this multiplicity of oppositions, one finds equally vigorous 
incongruence between the genres: Lear, rightly called a tragedy, draws 
fundamentally upon history, romance, romantic comedy, comedy, and 
even morality. Particular attention has been given to the presence of 
comic motifs and structures throughout. Critics interested in the comic 
dimensions of Lear (Susan Snyder, Ronald Miller, Emrys Jones, John 
Danby) have focused on the role of the Fool, on the disguiser figures, 
and on the motif of redemption. Yet, these comic elements are not 
manifested in typical ways: Shakespeare’s “comic scenes do not relieve 
                                                 
1  “Take your practiced powers and stretch them out / until they span the chasm 
between two / contradictions;” from Rilke’s untitled poem that begins “Da dich das 
geflügelte Entzücken.”   
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 but rather heighten the tragic movement” (Orgel 118). Even Susan 
Snyder, whose The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare’s Tragedies (1979) 
helped reinstate the comic genre in the foreground of Shakespearean 
criticism, cannot deny that these “constant appeals to the world of 
romantic comedy . . . are often twisted to serve, intensify, the 
immediate tragic effect” (141). Yet in this play deemed by Ann 
Thompson as “ENORMOUS . . . in every sense” (9), generic complication 
is not the only critical predicament. Indeed, to focus solely on form 
cannot but neglect the intricacies involved in the question of spiritual 
identity, for Lear has room enough to house Christian, pagan, 
nihilistic, existential interpretations, and more. Ronald Miller reflects 
on the very tension between the formal and spiritual complexities in 
Shakespeare’s darkest tragedy: 
I am conscious that calling King Lear a comedy will not resolve the 
debates about the positive—redemptive, if you will—aspects of the 
play which have dominated Lear criticism for many years. Neither a 
study of the tragic nor of the comic form in and of itself will 
determine whether the play is informed by a Christian 
understanding, though I am quite willing to grant that an answer 
to this question may be more important in the scheme of things 
than any adjudication about genre.  On the other hand, neither will 
resolution of the ongoing debate about the religious overtones 
settle a debate about form. Some kind of dialectical marriage 
between cognitive load and form will have to be made. (22) 
 
Indeed, in order to approach Lear holistically, and, in Rilke’s words, to 
“span the chasm” between cognitive load and form “some kind of 
dialectical marriage . . . will have to be made” (22 emphasis added). 
While many notable studies have been made separately on the formal 
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 structure and cognitive content, no study has yet, to my knowledge, 
combined these problems and sought a unified, and unifying, 
alternative. To see whether or not such an alternative that combines 
formal and spiritual meaning exists, and what that might entail, will be 
the task of this project.2
 Mikhail Bakhtin, theoretician of the dialogic, writes that “truth is 
not born nor is to be found inside the head of an individual person; it 
is born between people collectively searching for the truth” 
(Dostoevsky 110). Like many other famous thinkers, Bakhtin takes his 
cue from Plato: “For Bakhtin, for Kierkegaard, and Erasmus, the first 
port of call is the Socratic dialogue” (Gash 180). Since we are seeking, 
as Miller writes, a “dialectical marriage,” it would be worthwhile to 
return directly to the touchstone of the dialectical process at the 
wellspring of the centuries-long debate on the relationship between 
comedy and tragedy: Plato and his Symposium, which work is also 
                                                 
 
2 There is first the problem of textual authority. The relation between the Q (quarto) 
text (or the True Chronicle Historie, 1608), and the F (Folio) text (or the Tragedy of
King Lear, 1623) is one that is not easily resolved, for arguments for and against 
each version are all well founded. Some favour the quarto because they believe that it 
“derives from an early manuscript copy in Shakespeare’s hand, and that the Folio 
derives from a considerably altered and revised version, one more closely 
approximating the play as the author visualised it in performance” (Halio xiii). So 
while the Q text provides a fuller, more expansive rendition of Lear, the F text may 
be more authentic; and yet each “involves problems of its own” (xiii). In the end, the 
“final choice will depend on one’s preference” (xiii). This project, in the end, will 
favour the Folio because it offers a more tightly-focused version, and one that is 
more likely to represent the author’s final thoughts. It will be necessary at times to 
return to the quarto, though, for its fuller versions of particular scenes. All 
quotations, unless otherwise indicated, will be derived from The Tragedy of King Lear 
edited by Jay. L. Halio. Moreover, first Folio spelling of characters’ names will be used 
when citing this editor, but will vary in critical material and in alternate editions. All 
quotations outside of Halio’s edition will be taken from The Riverside Shakespeare, 
and will be indicated by an asterisk (*).  
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 religiously focused, for the core of the dialogue is a discussion on the 
god Eros. While the whole of the Symposium is kaleidoscopically rich in 
philosophical and spiritual insight, it is the final scene in which 
Socrates speaks to Agathon and Aristophanes about the nature of 
comedic and tragic art that is most relevant here. While this scene is 
loaded with relevance to Lear, Orgel warns us that “no Renaissance 
theorist . . . cites the passages as a precedent” (118). Even without a 
tidy reception history, the final scene of the Symposium offers much to 
the reader of Lear. 
 At the end of Plato’s famous dialogue, Socrates is trying to 
persuade two very drunk and very tired creative geniuses, Agathon the 
tragedian and Aristophanes the comedian, of the inseparable nature of 
the two genres. Socrates, who sits between them, cannot complete his 
idea, for both poets, exhausted from the night’s affairs, fall asleep: 
Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, drinking out 
of a large cup which they were passing from left to right. Socrates 
was talking to them. Aristodemus couldn’t remember exactly what 
they were saying—he’d missed the first part of their discussion, 
and he was half-asleep anyway—but the main point was that 
Socrates was trying to prove to them that authors should be able 
to write both comedy and tragedy: the skilful tragic dramatist 
should also be a comic poet. He was about to clinch his argument, 
though, truth to tell, sleepy as they were, they were hardly able to 
follow his reasoning. In fact, Aristophanes fell asleep in the middle 
of the discussion, and very soon thereafter, as day was breaking, 
Agathon also drifted off. (223C-223D) 
 
One’s initial reaction to this passage might be disappointment. By not 
completing Socrates’ thought, Plato has spurred generations of critics 
to study the complex dynamics between the apparent polar opposites 
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 of comedy and tragedy. As part of the puzzle, there is Socrates who 
“after getting them off to sleep . . . got up and left” (223D). From 
Agathon’s house, the location of the evening’s symposium, Socrates 
went “directly to the Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just 
as he always did, and only then, as evening was falling, went home to 
rest” (223D). A series of questions immediately arises. First, what has 
Socrates to do with the problem of comedy and tragedy? What does it 
mean that he stays awake, while the others eventually drift into sleep? 
Socrates offers a key to the question of genres, and occupies a 
possible space of unification: what might this mean? And finally, the 
inevitable, most important question: who is Socrates? This last 
question might serve as a key to the others. By looking at the 
mysterious personality of Socrates, we come closer to seeing what 
unites the formal and spiritual dimensions in Lear. 
 What can be known about Socrates, that proverbially elusive figure 
who evades easy characterization? In his speech at the symposium, 
Alcibiades tells us that, foremost, Socrates is unique, and that there is 
“no one else in the past and no one in the present” like him (221D): 
There is a parallel for everyone—everyone else, that is. But this 
man here is so bizarre, his way and his ideas are so unusual, that, 
search as you might, you’ll never find anyone else, alive or dead, 
who’s even remotely like him. (221D) 
 
Socrates is declared by the Oracle at Delphi to be the wisest man in 
Athens, and yet he never flaunts his knowledge; rather, the only thing 
he claims to know is that he knows nothing. While Plato emphasizes 
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 many more aspects of Socrates’ nature—his ironical responses, his 
piercing comments—one cannot help but notice how Plato draws 
especial attention to Socrates’ foolish or clown-like characteristics. To 
begin with, Socrates sounds like a fool: 
If you were to listen to his arguments, at first they’d strike you as 
totally ridiculous; they’re clothed in words as coarse as the hides 
worn by the most vulgar satyrs. He’s always going on about pack-
asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he’s always making 
the same tired points in the same tired old words. If you are 
foolish, or simply unfamiliar with him, you’d find it impossible not 
to laugh at his arguments. (221E) 
 
Plato shows how Socrates sounds like a fool; but, he also looks like a 
fool. Erasmus, the Renaissance master of folly whose work draws much 
from Plato, writes in Adages (1536) about the strange and clown-like 
appearance of Socrates: “He had a yokel’s face, with a bovine look 
about it, and a snub nose always running; you could have thought him 
to be some stupid, thick-headed clown” (243, translation altered; cf. 
Zanker, ch. 1 passim). What can we know about Socrates? He is a crass 
fool.  
 Socrates’ relationship to Silenus further emphasizes the 
unmistakable importance of the fool when identifying Socrates. 
Silenus, a mythological forest demigod, is the teacher and companion 
of Dionysus, god of wine and fertility. Since Silenus is often portrayed 
“drunk, he is believed to always tell the truth, but tell it in riddles” 
(Anderson 104). Such blurting of truth typifies the fool. For instance, 
Lear’s Fool is an “all-licensed” (1.4.160) critic given freedom to speak 
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 truth at any moment, and this truth is often uttered in riddle or rhyme. 
But it is the tension between the inner and outer realities of Silenus 
that links him directly with the fool, for the fool at every moment 
experiences the tension between his interior and exterior worlds. The 
fool is never as he seems. Sileni, the statues of Silenus, also appear 
ugly, but when they are opened, each one reveals miraculous carvings. 
Alcibiades perceives Socrates exactly this way:  
[Socrates] likes to say he’s ignorant and knows nothing. Isn’t this 
just like Silenus? Of course it is! And all this is just on the surface, 
like the outsides of those statues of Silenus . . . I don’t know if any 
of you have seen him when he’s really serious. But I once caught 
him when he was open like a Silenus’ statue, and I had a glimpse 
of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike—so 
bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing. (216E)  
 
With his rough surface and beautiful interior, Socrates exemplifies the 
role of the fool as a mask, a surface that epitomizes—sharpens, 
articulates—the tensions between inner and outer worlds. Socrates 
embodies the Silenus figure, which is the example par excellence of 
the fool as a mask. In connecting Socrates to the Sileni of Alcibiades, 
Plato brings “Socrates closer to being the archetype of the theatrical 
clown” (Gash 186). What can we know about Socrates then? He is a fool 
and a wise fool at that: “it was not unjust that in a time when 
philosophers abounded, this jester alone should have been declared by 
the oracle to be wise” (Adages 27).   
Socrates is a fool; this much is clear. But what does his folly have 
to do with Lear?  When Socrates, the fool, surpasses the sleep of tragic 
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 Agathon and comic Aristophanes, he responds to the question the 
world thinks he forfeits. With Socrates’ wakefulness, the genres have 
come to an end, their individual identifications as “comedy” and 
“tragedy” having fallen into rest. When this happens, the genres unite 
so perfectly so as to produce something entirely new. Then the former 
designations (i.e. “comedy” and “tragedy”) are no longer needed, for 
they are no longer true; they “fall asleep,” having served their purpose. 
This “something new” that is produced is represented by Socrates: this 
“something new” is the fool. With this in mind, Plato’s suggestion is 
highly relevant to Lear, for in all of Shakespeare’s tragedies, while 
comedy and tragedy always operate in close proximity, in Lear only is 
their union achieved. Susan Snyder articulates this achievement of 
generic union in Lear: 
From Romeo to Lear one can see Shakespeare moving through 
these possibilities in the order I have just set out: that is, comedy 
and tragedy functioning first as polar opposites, later as two sides 
of the same coin, and finally as two elements in a single 
compound. (5) 
 
If one follows the Socratic consequences of this formal unification into 
a single compound, one should expect the fool to play a revelatory, 
combinatory, definitive role in Lear—and, indeed, one’s expectations 
are not disappointed. The Fool,3 in fact, is pivotal in King Lear.  
 In no other Shakespearean play does the Fool have such an 
essential role; in Lear for the first time, the Fool is on the stage as a 
                                                 
3 Since this thesis refers both to Lear’s Fool and to fools in general, only Lear’s Fool 
will receive capitalization. All other references to the fool will be in lower case. 
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 major character: “the Fool surpasses all his predecessors in that 
Shakespeare manages here to make the clown a vital component of a 
great tragedy” (Reibetanz 93). That the Fool has a major role at all is in 
itself striking, but especially so when we consider that in 
Shakespeare’s “source play, King Leir, there is no court fool” (Videbæk 
134). Emphasis on the fool is clear. The Fool, holds A.C. Bradley, is 
“one of Shakespeare’s triumphs in King Lear” (311). Thus, Bradley 
certainly does not agree with Nahum Tate, who in 1681 altered the 
Lear tragedy because he felt Shakespeare’s version was indecorously 
harsh and unjust. In Tate’s version, which was accepted and even 
preferred by Samuel Johnson, he married Cordelia and Edgar and made 
Cordelia Queen among many changes. Tate’s version was popularly 
accepted and played on the English stage for more than 150 years: no 
other “Shakespearean tragedy, however painful, was felt to be so in 
need of revision that critics and public could accept an alternate 
version for so long, with so little objection” (Snyder 140). One of Tate’s 
most drastic editorial decisions, though, was to cut the role of the Fool 
completely, a decision that Bradley refutes: “to remove him [the Fool] 
would spoil its harmony, as the harmony of a picture would be spoiled 
if one of the colours were extracted” (Bradley 311). It is Northrop Frye, 
though, who makes perhaps the most striking observation about the 
Fool. Frye observes that there is not just one fool in Lear, or even two 
for that matter, but rather that the “word ‘fool’ is in course of time 
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 applied to almost every decent character in the play” (Sandler 110). 
Strangely enough, Frye “does not press on a great deal further with 
this insight” (Evans 4). It is the second intention of this project, then, 
to press on and discern why the fool appears in such overt 
superabundance on this dark, ever-transforming, and apocalyptic 
landscape of King Lear. It does seem strange in this play deemed as 
Shakespeare’s darkest that the fool should factor so prominently. It is 
almost as if Jaques’ “ducdame”4 that is sounded in As You Like It finally 
succeeds much later in King Lear in gathering all fools in this unusual 
collective. Before one can ask why they, the fools, are present en 
masse in this tragedy imbued with bitterness, hostility, and malice, it is 
important to know who they are.  
For those who are called fools, the title does not carry a consistent 
meaning; it is used both endearingly and pejoratively. Those who 
evade being specified as fools use the term as an insult, while the fools 
among themselves use the term more benignly, even affectionately. 
For example, the crafty Edmond calls his father Gloucester, and 
brother Edgar, foolish: 
                                                 
4  JAQUES. If it do come to pass 
       That any man turn ass, 
  Leaving his wealth and ease 
  A stubborn will to please, 
  Ducdame, ducdame, ducdame! 
  Here shall he see 
  Gross fools as he, 
  And if he will come to me. 
 AMIENS. What’s that “ducdame”? 
 JAQUES. ’Tis a Greek invocation, to call fools into a circle. (2.5.50-60)* 
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 A credulous father and a brother noble, 
Whose nature is so far from doing harms 
That he suspects none; on whose foolish honesty 
My practices ride easy. I see the business. 
Let me, if not by my birth, have lands by wit. 
All with me’s meet that I can fashion fit. (1.2.151-156 emphasis 
added)  
 
Edmond regards both Gloucester and Edgar, his unsuspecting kin, as 
naïve, gullible, and excessively simple. We shall discuss below the 
difference between the fool who is wise and the one who is foolish, for 
not all fools are the same. At this point it is important mainly to 
recognize who the fools are in the play. 
Albany, who in the end changes sympathy and abandons 
Gonerill—who, like Edmond, is also not hailed as fool—is himself 
called a fool five times in Act Four alone. When Albany is slow to 
summon his army to meet the approaching French, Gonerill chides and 
insults him: 
 France speaks his banners in our noiseless land,  
With plumed helm thy state begins [to threat], 
Whilst thou, a moral fool, sits still and cries, 
“Alack, why does he so?”] (4.2. 56-59)* 
 
Albany is a moral fool, which coming from Gonerill, who is farthest 
from being a moral touchstone, is meant to be anything but 
complimentary: seen thus, Albany’s scruples mark the fullest reach of 
his insanity—morality equals disability. Again, to Albany’s rebuke, 
Gonerill retorts, “O vain fool!” (4.2.37), which suggests that not only 
are Albany’s moral efforts futile, but that they also stem from a self-
gratifying, narcissistic source.   
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 The Fool himself is one of the first characters, though, to start 
bestowing this highly-charged name on others. The connotations 
behind the Fool’s renaming are significantly more than those of 
Gonerill’s. Kent, imprisoned in the stocks, heeds the Fool’s wisdom, 
but is branded a fool as the consequence:  
FOOL.  I would have none but knaves follow it [advice] since a fool 
gives  
   it. 
 That sir which serves and seeks for gain 
      And follows but for form,  
 Will pack when it begin to rain  
      And leave thee in the storm. 
 But I will tarry, the fool will stay,  
      And let the wise man fly; 
 The knave turns fool that runs away,  
      The fool no knave, perdy. 
KENT.  Where learned you this, fool? 
FOOL.  Not i’th’stocks, fool. (2.4.69-81) 
 
The Fool uses the term both to identify Kent appropriately but also to 
mirror Kent’s own words. Fools are notorious for their mimicry. 
Cordelia, who also earns the common name of fool, is shown in the 
end with a mirror above her mouth. Lear commands that an attendant 
fetch him “a looking-glass; / If that her breath will mist or stain the 
stone, / Why then she lives” (5.3.235-7). While the mirror is used 
practically to ascertain whether or not she is still alive, the mirror also 
takes on symbolic implications: uttering sound, drawing breath, 
without sound or breath, the fool is a mirror—mimic and epitome—of 
humanity. 
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 In one of the best-known lines of the play, Lear calls Cordelia a 
fool. Lear uses the name entirely affectionately. Here Lear confirms 
Cordelia’s role as fool in the play, and in an image reminiscent of the 
Pietà, Lear holds Cordelia and laments her death: “And my poor fool is 
hanged” (5.3.279). The relationship between Cordelia and the Fool will 
be discussed further below; here it is important to note that Cordelia is 
called a fool, lovingly, plangently, by her father.  
But the most striking references to the fool are to Lear. 
Shakespeare, from the beginning of the play, shows that “Folly’s cap 
sits on the greatest of them, King Lear” (Reibetanz 104). Gonerill is the 
first to call Lear a fool when she relates to Oswald her real opinion of 
her father: 
    Idle old man, 
That still would manage those authorities 
That he hath given away! Now, by my life, 
Old fools are babes again, and must be us’d 
With checks as flatteries, when they are seen abus’d. (1.3.16-20)*  
 
For Gonerill, her father is nothing but an old fool, unpredictable and 
extemporaneous as a child whose untimely behaviour must be 
controlled with “checks as flatteries.” Again, Gonerill cuts down 
masterful men by calling them fools: the term points to their 
impotence. But the most striking reference to Lear as fool is, 
predictably, by the Fool himself. Having banished Cordelia and Kent, 
and given his power and wealth to Regan and Gonerill, the old king 
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 begins to respond to the Fool’s comments, hesitantly at first but with 
increasing confidence, with marked wit, just like a fool:  
 FOOL.  Canst tell how an oyster makes his shell? 
LEAR.  No. 
FOOL.  Nor I neither; but I can tell why a snail has a house. 
LEAR.  Why? 
FOOL.  Why, to put ’s head in, not to give it away to his daughters, 
  and leave his horns without a case. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
FOOL.   The reason why the seven  
     stars are no mo than seven is a pretty reason. 
 LEAR.  Because they are not eight. 
FOOL.  Yes, indeed, thou wouldst make a good fool. (1.5.21-6, 28-
31) 
 
Even the Fool is impressed with Lear’s apparently new-found fool-like 
abilities to fix on an unconsidered potential to multiply meaning. One 
begins to sense early on in Lear a developing realization of 
Ecclesiastes’ “infinitus est numerus stultorum” (1:15). One also 
perceives the echoes of earlier Renaissance works in which fools and 
their lives’ journeys are listed, namely Sebastian Brant’s Narrenschiff,
The Ship of Fools (1494). It would not be a stretch to compare Lear to 
Brant’s influential Narrenschiff, a sea vessel brimming with every type 
of fool that sets sail for a fool’s paradise. Although the destination of 
the Lear vessel, as it were, still needs to be ascertained, the striking 
bounty of fools in the tragedy makes one view Lear as a ship of fools 
indeed. 
 
Shakespeare’s spectacular emphasis on the fool signals to the 
reader that the drama will not follow the standard structural patterns, 
but will “[c]rack [dramatic] moulds” and present the reader perhaps 
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 with a new generic emphasis (3.2.8). Lear’s desire to “[c]rack nature’s 
moulds” (3.2.8) indicates that the play does not just express a desire 
to treat form in an entirely uncharacteristic and unique way, but 
executes this treatment. The uniqueness of the play’s form, like the 
uniqueness of the fool and the uniqueness of Socrates, renders Lear 
fascinating. The tragic drama, itself like a fool with its singular and 
enigmatic composition, presents the reader with a dark, harsh, even 
apocalyptic landscape that suddenly and without warning explodes 
into one “great stage of fools” (4.5.175).  
Knowledge of the history of the genres which the fool is uniting is 
necessary, for the fool does not dismiss them, but rather embodies 
them. Thus, history of the comic and tragic genres will be brought into 
the discussion as necessary. Still, the fool does not belong to any 
genre—and never has— even though he is often spoken of as 
mechanical property of the comic genre, or, socially speaking, of the 
performance festivals annually celebrated. For example, the satire and 
invective of Lear’s Fool arise in the sots and sotties of the late-
medieval French tradition. These sotties were dramas performed in the 
marketplaces at specific festive points during the liturgical and 
seasonal calendar—Mardi Gras, Epiphany, Christmas Eve, and 
Midsummer’s Day—and which contained “virulent invective and strong 
critique of contemporary morals and politics” (Perret 413). Lear’s Fool 
also “strongly critiques”—even harshly—the king’s political and moral 
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 decisions. In her classic study The Fool, Enid Welsford points out, for 
example, that the fool commonly functions as an “‘all-licensed’ critic 
who sees the truth about the people around him” (256), and as a “link 
between the stage and auditorium” (248). Lear’s Fool is called an “all-
licensed fool” (1.4.160), who also might function as the revealer of 
truth and a tie between audience and stage. While many similarities 
can be identified between medieval fools and Lear’s Fool, it is 
important to recognize the individuality of each, which recalls the 
uniqueness that Alcibiades saw in Socrates. Robert Armin, who joined 
Shakespeare’s acting troupe, warrants special esteem for his 
contribution to Lear’s Fool. Armin’s success at playing fools took off 
after meeting Richard Tarlton, “playwright, ballad maker, fencer, 
tumbler, and dramatic clown” (Aspinall 42). A multi-talented, even 
protean fool, Armin had a great influence on Shakespeare’s own 
interest in the fool, and his first role as Touchstone in As You Like It, 
1599, began a “long and productive professional association” (144). 
Nonetheless, no fool is a mere instrument of theatrical strategy, even 
though he will have qualities common to other fools. The attributes of 
truth-telling and analogizing, for instance, may indeed be manifest in 
many fools, but not because of any tradition of foolery. For while the 
fools across time share a multiplicity of characteristics (clothing, wit, 
scepter or bauble, function), each fool is a perfectly new and fresh 
creation in himself: 
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 Clowns maintain their distinctive characteristics despite, not 
because of, tradition. All Greek and Roman comedies, the medieval 
religious plays, the Commedia dell’arte and the English 
Harlequinade certainly possess definite types in common. Yet 
these are the very types that are manifestly not borrowed but 
spontaneously created afresh . . . [At] each [historical] 
metamorphosis the world has to hatch another clown from a clod. 
(Disher 33-4) 
 
One should acknowledge the rootedness of Robert Armin and Lear’s 
Fool within their particular social and literary contexts. Disher’s fool 
that is “spontaneously created afresh” reasserts Plato’s own emphasis, 
through the mouth of Alcibiades, on the uniqueness of Socrates, and 
thus the fool. Alcibiades hails the originality of Socrates’ personality as 
“by far the most amazing thing about him” (221C). It would be 
stultifying to forget the fool’s singularity, and to treat his creation like 
the shaping of cookies all from the same cutter. Thus, insofar as there 
is a tradition of the fool, this tradition necessitates change and 
variation, and is not mere repetition without development or 
uniqueness. The fool is not an instrument of a form but embodies 
form that is constantly being re-created within him. With this 
ahistorical dimension of the fool we are drawing nearer to the second 
aspect of the “dialectical marriage” between form and spiritual content.   
 The debate about religion in Lear is an on-going one, and is, of 
course, more far-reaching than can be discussed here. Many hold that 
much of Lear’s religious content stems from the old English morality 
plays in which personified experiences, moral states, and 
psychological qualities interact. For example, Pleasure, Pomp, and 
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 Fraud are characters in the play, Three Ladies of London by Robert 
Wilson (1584); these “characters” enact a drama with a heavily moral 
message. And yet, while the morality pattern of deception, fall, and 
purgation is detectable in Lear, “there is no doctrinal message” 
(Thompson 34). One could never identify Lear as solely a morality play, 
an allegory that establishes one-to-one correspondences between 
characters and abstract states. Lear, though, allows for greater range 
of correspondences between the literal and the abstract. Since Lear 
allows for multiple interpretations, critics often debate whether Lear is 
a pagan or a Christian play. Snyder holds that the play is pre-Christian: 
Shakespeare created for it [Lear] a thoroughly pagan milieu quite 
unlike that of his source play [King Leir, 1594], which is steeped in 
Christian allusion and assumption. The play world of Lear is 
emphatically, if not totally, primitive. (Snyder 178) 
 
Proof for Snyder’s argument is readily discernible. In the first scene, 
for example, when Lear banishes Cordelia, he swears by pagan figures: 
 For by the sacred radiance of the sun, 
 The mysteries of Hecate and the night, 
 By all the operation of the orbs 
 From whom we do exist and cease to be, 
 Here I disclaim all my parental care. (1.1.103-107) 
 
Lear also swears “by Apollo” (1.1.154), and “[b]y Jupiter” (1.1.172), 
even though Kent assures Lear that “thou swear’st thy gods in vain” 
(1.1.155). And yet the play is also imbued with Christian redemption 
and forgiveness. L.C. Knights writes that for “what takes place in King 
Lear we can find no other word than renewal” (187). A.C. Bradley 
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 asserts that it would even be appropriate to include the word 
“redemption” in the play’s title: 
Should we not be at least as near the truth if we called this poem 
The Redemption of King Lear, and declared that the business of 
‘the gods’ with him was neither to torment him, nor to teach him a 
‘noble anger,’ but to lead him to attain through apparently 
hopeless failure the very end and aim of life? (285) 
 
What is the reader supposed to make of this clash of religious systems 
in King Lear, a play which is, Snyder points out, “about religion in the 
making” (178)? To resolve this question, one may consider an analogy, 
namely the Tarot as a symbolically disclosing source of knowledge of 
the fool. This project would benefit from consideration of the Tarot, 
especially since both Lear and the Tarot are highly charged with 
symbolic content. Moreover, our understanding of the fool would 
benefit from knowledge of his position in the Arcana, for his unique 
placement illuminates much of the problem of spiritual complexities in 
Lear.  
What are the Major Arcana of the Tarot? The word arcana is 
derived from the Latin word arcanum meaning secret. However, the 
Major Arcana of the Tarot are neither “allegories nor secrets, because 
allegories are, in fact, only figurative representations of abstract 
notions, and secrets are only facts, procedures, practices, or whatever 
doctrines that one keeps to oneself for a personal motive” (Meditations 
4). In contrast with these, the Arcana are “authentic symbols [which] . . 
. conceal and reveal their sense at one and the same time” (4 emphasis 
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 added). There are moreover twenty-two such symbols upon which to 
meditate: the Magician; the High Priestess; the Empress; the Emperor; 
the Pope; the Lover; the Chariot; Justice; the Hermit; the Wheel of 
Fortune; Force; the Hanged Man; Death; Temperance; the Devil; the 
Tower of Destruction; the Star; the Moon; the Sun; the Judgement; the 
Fool; and the World. The purpose in meditating on these authentic 
symbols that are “magic, mental, psychic and moral operations” is to 
awaken “new notions, ideas, sentiments and aspirations” (4). The 
application of the symbolic texture of the Tarot to Lear, a play rich 
with symbolic suggestion, can be fruitful. There is no threat that a 
symbolic interpretation will somehow reduce the characters to ideas or 
to abstractions; as John M. Lothian, a former professor of English at 
the University of Saskatchewan, asserted some time ago, “‘[p]art of the 
greatness of this play . . . is that so many of the characters, without 
becoming abstractions, are charged with symbolic significance’” (38). 
In this way, characters and objects can take on symbolic, conceptual, 
and imagistic significance without reducing the character or thing itself 
to abstraction. Moreover, the plays of the Shakespearean corpus can 
be seen as analogous to individual Arcana insofar as they have the 
power to awaken “new notions, ideas, sentiments, and aspirations” on 
the mental, psychic, and moral levels of the reader. 
The most well-known Tarot deck is the Marseilles deck dated to 
sixteenth-century France. In this deck, the fool is depicted as a poor 
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 man, who walks from left to right with a small sack slung over his right 
shoulder; on his journey, he does not even notice that a small dog that 
is biting his heels and has even ripped a sizable hole in his trousers. 
This emphasis on the “right” (i.e. the direction in which he walks, and 
the shoulder over which his bag is slung) indicates that he is a fool of 
the good: 
The Fool is walking from left to right. He holds his staff with his 
right hand, and with his left hand he balances on his right 
shoulder the staff from which the bag is hanging. His head is 
turned three-quarters to the right. So it is the Fool who has a 
tendency to the right . . . the Fool of the good, not of evil, which is 
also evident from the fact that he does not defend himself against 
the dog—which he could easily chase away by means of the staff. 
(Meditations 592) 
 
The fool of the good walks trustingly through the day, apparently 
unconcerned for earthly needs. By focusing on the sky, he might 
demonstrate how to elevate the mind to things that are not of the 
earth, but to that which is possibly transcendent. Another popular 
image of the Arcanum of the Fool from the Rider-Waite deck (early 
twentieth century England) consists of a man gazing, again, into the 
sky, even though he is nearing the edge of cliff, and is perhaps about 
to take a plunge. While these images signify many things, one can 
immediately see, especially in the fool who is about to walk off the 
cliff’s edge, the reality of childlike trust, and the proclivity for an 
elevated consciousness. How do these depictions of the fool 
correspond to what can be observed of Lear’s Fool and of other fools 
in Lear?  
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 Indeed, with the Fool’s constant appeals to common objects of the 
concrete world—he speaks of eggs, dogs, crusts, combs, school 
masters, cuckoos, horses, asses, foxes, snails, and more—one might 
conclude that Lear’s Fool is certainly not like the elevatedly 
concentrating fool of the Tarot. Lear’s Fool, it seems, is focused on the 
world, not on a possibly transcendent reality. This conclusion is apt 
until we realize that it is in and through these apparently mundane 
objects that the Fool finds and conveys meaning beyond the scope of 
the superficial. The Fool is like Bakhtin, as posited by Clark and 
Holquist, who finds God in the things of the world, and also in the 
dynamic and animated connection of language between people: 
Bakhtin sought God not in what John of the Cross called “the flight 
of the alone to the alone” but in the exact opposite, the space 
between men that can be bridged by the word, by utterance. 
Instead of seeking God’s place in stasis and silence, Bakhtin 
sought it in energy and communication. In seeking a connection 
between God and men, Bakhtin concentrated on the forces 
enabling connections, in society and in language, between men. 
(62) 
 
Whether or not Clark and Holquist are apt in their suggestion that St. 
John’s was a static experience is debatable. There is no reason to 
believe either that Clark and Holquist’s dichotomy is mutually 
exclusive—that is, the same spiritual experience can occur whether in 
solitude or surrounded by community and the world’s plurality. There 
is no way of knowing whether the Fool actually experiences some kind 
of mystical union as St. John depicts in his Dark Night of the Soul, for 
the Fool’s experience does not manifest itself as religious poetry, but 
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 into talk of combs and crusts and snails. Yet that the Fool’s words are 
loaded with meaning is unquestionable. Also unquestionable is that 
the fool is in and of the world. He does his contemplation, as it were, 
not in solitude in the heights of mountains, but among the people and 
the bustle. For the Fool, the world is brimming with significance and 
meaning.    
Additionally, the number given to the Tarot card “The Fool” reveals 
much—not only about his nature, but also about the spiritual 
complexities he embodies. The numerical designation assigned to the 
fool is, in fact, zero, which is perhaps surprising considering that it 
was just posited that the fool lives in the diversity and multiplicity of 
the world. But the relationship between zero, or nothing, and 
everything, though, soon explains the numerical designation zero 
given to the fool:  
The Fool is the Spirit of God about to descend into the nothing . . . 
at the beginning of creation. And the Fool is also the spirit of man 
approaching the One.  The One pervades all things and is free of 
limitations. It contains all qualities and yet has no qualities . . . The 
Fool is the 0 which contains all things but is nothing. (Cavendish 
114)5
 
Cavendish’s insight reveals much about the Fool’s role in Lear. The 
Fool is nothing himself, but he contains within himself the entire 
                                                 
5 Borges’ sketch “Everything and Nothing” depicts a Shakespeare who has intimately 
experienced the reality of being every character he penned, and none, of being every 
person in the world, and no one : 
The story goes that, before or after he died, he found himself before God and 
he said: “I, who have been so many men in vain, want to be one man: myself.” 
The voice of God replied from a whirlwind: “Neither am I one self; I dreamed the 
world as you dreamed your work, my Shakespeare, and among the shapes of my 
dream are you, who, like me, are many persons—and none.” (47) 
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 peopled world with its multiplicity of things and objects. The language 
of the Fool demonstrates that he does indeed symbolically contain the 
world within, for he speaks only of things of the world, of everyday 
objects, but loads them with meaning and significance. The Fool uses 
the apparently mundane objects as a way of speaking of deeper truths. 
The word contains here is central to this concept. The fool, as we have 
just seen, is nothing, but nothing or no thing could not itself function 
as a container; nothing could not hold anything, let alone the 
everything of the fool. Therefore, something must function as a 
container of the All; this something is the mask of the fool, and the 
Silenus mask of Socrates that holds the universe within itself. The 
fool’s mask is the boundary between the All that he contains and the 
everyday exterior reality. It is in wearing a mask, particularly the mask 
of madness, that the fool is able to contact a meaningful reality. 
Madness plays no small part in any study of Lear. In this play that 
shatters boundaries on countless fronts, madness is no exception, and 
the margins of fatuity and perfect senselessness are pushed to new 
extremes. 
The fool, the mask, madness, spirituality—all of these soon gain 
an exceedingly close proximity, so close that they even, at times, 
become synonymous. To equate a place or a character with a concept, 
that is, to suggest that the hovel on the heath in Act Three, with its 
juxtaposition of inner/outer dimensions, is the mask, or to say that the 
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 fool is the mask: is this symbolic? The former example is symbolic; the 
hovel, as we shall see, does come to signify the mask, and thus will 
inform the nature of masking. The latter example concerning the fool 
is symbolism also, but a particular kind of symbolism pertaining only 
to fools. The hovel on its own does not necessarily take on additional 
meaning. The shelter is just that. Also, any character can gain symbolic 
stature (i.e. Cordelia can potentially symbolize all goodness and virtue, 
Gonerill can potentially symbolize one-sided evil), and yet stripped of 
these qualities, they are who they are, no more, no less. With the fool, 
though, the case is different. Fool here refers to one who is a 
permanent fool, and not to those who enter into his sphere for a time 
and then leave it—namely all the fools in Lear besides the Fool. Even 
without any additional signification, the fool is more than who he is. In 
other words, by nature, the fool is more than real, almost ideal: 
Clown fools represented a certain form of life which was real and
ideal at the same time. They stood borderline and life and art, in a 
peculiar midzone, as it were; they were neither eccentrics nor 
dolts, neither were they comedic actors.  (Bakhtin Rabelais 8 
emphasis added).   
 
 
The treatment of the fool and symbolism is unique since he is 
archetypal or ideal and real simultaneously. Thus to say that the fool 
embodies the mask, or, rather, is the mask, carries a different meaning 
than if the analogy were made with any other character. Yet the ideal 
nature allows for, even demands, such equations; the nature of such 
ideality can only be hinted at, and these hints consist of various 
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 images, topics and analogies. An increasing intimacy of topics related 
to the fool to the point of equality is, therefore, to be expected, and 
strict distinction is not only unnecessary, but also impracticable. Just 
as Bergson prefers a subtle and imperceptible gradation of the comic 
to a strict definition of comedy, so shall we for the fool: 
Our excuse of attacking the problem [of the comic] in our turn 
must lie in the fact that we shall not aim at imprisoning the comic 
spirit within a definition. We regard it, above all, as a living thing. 
However trite it may be, we shall treat it with the respect due to 
life. We shall confine ourselves to watching it grow and expand. 
Passing by imperceptible gradations from one form to another, it 
will be seen to achieve the strangest metamorphosis. (12) 
 
In the spirit of Bergson, we shall also treat the fool “with the respect 
due to life,” and allow the issues that surround him to take full form.  
In the ensuing chapters, we shall explore the relationship, the 
equivalence rather, of the fool and the mask: whatever is associated 
with the mask becomes equally relevant for the fool. A simple 
algebraic formula may suffice to clarify relationships between images 
and concepts in some cases: if a = b and b = c, then a = c. We shall 
see  how one of the play’s most thematically rich spaces—namely the 
hovel with its inner/outer orientation, its rough, frail, paltry exterior 
containing a fantastic, ever-expanding wealth of possibilities—locates 
the topics associated with the mask at centre stage. What takes place 
within the hovel (a), now mask (b), illuminates the fool (c) and makes 
the topic of folly central to the play. Similarly, madness and the satyr 
chorus will also be treated analogically with folly. By allowing several 
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 authors and topics to enter into the problem of the fool, we shall 
attempt to expand the boundary of what is generally known about him, 
and in doing so, understand more deeply the nature of this mysterious 
figure and the reason for his kaleidoscopic presence in King Lear. 
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 “All germens spill at once” 
 
 
When Frye makes his striking observation (that the “word ‘fool’ is 
in course of time applied to practically every decent character in the 
play” [Sandler 110]), he qualifies the statement by adding that those 
“who are not fools are people like Goneril and Regan and Edmund, who 
live according to the conditions of the lower or savage nature they do 
so well in” (110). In this way, Frye creates distinctions between the 
characters: those who are fools, who have been already identified, and 
those who are not. Shakespearean criticism has long divided the Lear 
characters into two collectives. This critical process of division does 
not limit any interpretation of character or text, as it may seem, but 
actually fulfils what the text itself demands: “[the characters] fall into 
two distinct groups, which are strongly, even violently, contrasted” 
(Bradley 263). Whether it is true or not, as Bradley writes, that none of 
the Lear characters “strikes us as psychologically a wonderful creation, 
like Hamlet or Iago or even Macbeth; one or two seen even to be 
somewhat faint and thin” (263), the reader certainly seems to witness 
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 in the lines of the Lear drama, not something individual, but rather 
something universal:  
[There] comes that feeling, which haunts us in King Lear, as 
though we were witnessing something universal,—a conflict not so 
much of particular persons as of the powers of good and evil in 
the world. (263) 
 
Among the two alliances there seems to be “one spirit breathing 
through” each group (263). And this “one spirit” in each group, Bradley 
holds, aligns itself with either force, Love or Strife, identified by 
Empedocles: 
[T]he radical differences of the two species are emphasized in 
broad hard strokes; and the two are set in conflict, almost as if 
Shakespeare, like Empedocles, were regarding Love and Hate as 
the two ultimate forces in the universe. (263)1
 
And while these two species, which we have hitherto designated as 
fools and non-fools, and which are “emphasized in broad hard 
strokes” are critically noticed, their formal designations change with 
every critic. 
 While Bradley deems the forces Love and Strife, Susan Snyder uses 
different terms, which she borrows from F.M. Cornford’s discussion of 
                                                 
 
1  Fragment seventeen of Empedocles states that Love is the binding force in the 
universe, and Hate, the dividing force: 
I shall tell of a double (process): at one time it increased so as to be a single 
One out of Many; at another time again it grew apart so as to be Many out of 
One. There is a double creation of mortals and a double decline: the union of all 
things causes the birth and destruction of the one (race of mortals), the other is 
reared as the elements grow apart, and then flies asunder. And these (elements) 
never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence 
of Love, so that all become One, at other times again each moving apart 
through the hostile force of Hate. Thus in so far as they have the power to grow 
into One out of Many, and again, when the One grows apart and Many are 
formed, in this sense they come into being and have no stable life; but in so far 
as they never cease their continuous exchange, in this sense they remain always 
unmoved (unaltered) as they follow the cyclic process.  (53) 
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 Old Comedy. Cornford, who himself draws from Aristotle, provides 
Snyder with the relevant taxonomies. The first type, the Ironical type 
(eiron) applies to the fools, while the second type, the Impostor type 
(alazon), applies to the non-fools. The term eiron in the “fifth century 
appears to mean ‘cunning’ or (more exactly) ‘sly’” (Cornford 137). The 
most significant aspect of the eiron character is that he “masks his 
cleverness under a show of clownish dullness” (138). This character is 
clever, understated, and his “‘buffoonery’ (βωµολοχία) is only the outer 
wear of ‘irony’” (138). The parallels to Socrates are apparent, for he, 
who is known for his ironical speeches, wears such a mask of clownish 
buffoonery. The alazon character, on the other hand, makes himself 
out to be more than he is: 
[Alazon characters] are in general imprudent and absurd 
pretenders, and that in two ways. In the first place, they put up a 
claim to share in advantages and delights which they have done 
nothing to deserve. In the writings of the philosophers ‘Alazon’ is 
almost synonymous with ‘liar.’ The two words are constantly 
coupled in Plato; and in Aristotle the vice of imposture or 
swaggering occupies one extreme in opposition to the mean of 
‘truthfulness.’ (140) 
 
To put these definitions together we learn that the fool is an 
understated, ironical (eiron) character who has concern not for himself, 
but for the other. On the other hand, the non-fools are overstated, 
dishonest (alazon) figures who are not concerned for others, but for 
themselves. The tension between the groups is certain, and their 
characteristics, distinct. The study of the nature of the eiron group will 
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 be the subject of this chapter, and the significantly dissimilar nature of 
the alazon faction will be discussed in the following chapter.   
 The group of fools is excessive in emotion, desire, and manner, as 
we shall see. It is understandable, moreover, that the fools behave so 
excessively, given their partly comic heritage with its emphasis on 
multiplicity: 
Comic conventions, for all their diversity, do reveal common 
assumptions. The mode is too rich to enclose in any one formula, 
but the most pervasive principle is surely the rejection of 
singleness. The single self is seen as deficient, in more sense than 
one . . . And the conventional plot movement [of a Shakespearean 
comedy] itself, toward marriage, or, more usually, marriages, 
implies that twoness is better than oneness. (Snyder 51) 
 
 “Twoness is better than oneness”—one could hardly find a better 
definition of the comic. This emphasis on the plurality of comedy is 
exactly why Bergson writes in Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of 
the Comic (1913), a chapter entitled the “Expansive Force of Comic.” 
This force is not restricted only to literal multiplicity in marriage and 
then children, but applies to emotional growth as well. Romeo, the 
tragic lover, celebrates the phenomenon of the emotional expansion of 
joy: 
 Ah, Juliet, if the measure of joy 
 Be heap’d like mine, and that thy skill be more 
 To blazon it, then sweeten with thy breath 
 This neighbor air, and let rich [music’s] tongue 
 Unfold the imagin’d happiness that both 
 Receive in either by this dear encounter. (Romeo and Juliet 2.6.24-
29)* 
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 And for Juliet, it is her love that grows and exceeds her 
comprehension: 
 Conceit, more rich in matter than in words, 
 Brags of his substance, not of ornament; 
 They are but beggars that can count their worth, 
 But my true love is grown to such excess 
 I cannot sum up sum of half my wealth.  (2.6.30-34)* 
 
Emotional states, friendships, and virtues (the Greeks’ Courage, 
Fortitude, Prudence, Temperance, as well the Christians’ Faith, Hope, 
and Charity), are all potentially expansive, irreducible, and limitless. 
This is not to say that limitations and boundaries are not in any way 
useful, even fundamental, to the condition of the latter virtues. Limit 
(i.e. Temperance) is seen as the virtue upon which all others are built, 
and Aristotle has limit (i.e. the mean)2 as the ultimate goal of the life of 
the soul. Nevertheless, it would follow that if in this insistent 
dichotomization one group is expansive, the other group would be 
constrictive. Hate, jealousy, and violence are also limitless, but they, 
nevertheless, impose restrictions on their neighbours. If the fools 
embody plurality, the non-fools would embody singleness and 
isolation, which has yet to be proven. Nevertheless, the plurality of the 
fools and the restrictive singleness of the non-fools might reveal the 
deep tension at the foundations of King Lear.  
                                                 
2  Aristotle holds that moral virtues are ruined by excess and defect. The ideal, 
therefore, of the moral life is the mean, and virtuous action must become habitual. 
Virtuous actions are performed “at the right time, toward the right objects, toward 
the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner—that is the median 
and the best course, the course that is a mark of virtue” (Nichomachean Ethics, II, 6). 
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  No one can help us understand this apparently inherent tension 
between singular and plural spheres better than Bakhtin, whose 
philosophical and linguistic contributions on laughter, on the carnival, 
and on the nature of the word are renowned. Bakhtin believed ardently 
in the “pluralism of thought and culture, and what he called 
‘unfinalizability’ – the open-endedness of things – as if all forms of life 
were part of a huge, on-going ‘dialogue’” (Knowles 3). This 
‘unfinalizability’ of things is what we have hitherto deemed limitless 
and irreducible. What has been referred to as singular and plural, 
Bakhtin calls monologic and dialogic. While Bakhtin, a linguist, is 
concerned with the nature of the word, his insight into monologic and 
dialogic words applies to more than speech and poetry in Lear, but 
also reflects the actions, movements, and motivations of the eiron and 
alazon companies. The individuals who embody the eironic principles, 
the fools, have a deeply dialogic and, thus, expansive nature, while 
those with the alazonic disposition, the self-styled non-fools, have a 
monologic nature, and are interested in fixing, limiting, and binding 
those who oppose them. 
 The dialogic word, in which hope for newness may be found, is 
open-ended, undetermined, and responsive. With its tendency towards 
multiplicity, the dialogic word is, unsurprisingly, communal and 
egalitarian, while the monologic word seeks isolation, height, and 
distance. Indeed, while the monologic tendency is a source of 
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 distancing both from the other and from oneself, the dialogic 
inclination “draws nigh not only the other but oneself as well” 
(Patterson 9). Bakhtin’s notions on laughter contribute to the 
understanding of the dialogic word, for laughter has an open-ended 
and irrepressible nature. For Bakhtin, laughter is not just the specific 
physical response to something humourous, but—like the dialogic 
word—is the gateway to freedom, becoming, and openness: “laughter 
opens the gate to freedom”; “laughter is essential to the process of 
becoming”; “laughter launches us into the open and thus carries us 
into the depths” (Patterson 7-8).  
The fool is dialogic foremost, though, because of his inseparable 
connectedness to the mask, for behind the mask, several voices and 
identities may coexist. What Snyder writes about comedy applies to the 
mask as well:  
Comedy’s [or the mask’s] penchant for alternatives and multiple 
possibilities points naturally toward a flexible identity that may 
change in response to new situations, a self that is not fixed but 
alterable and even potentially plural. (Snyder 48) 
 
Fool and mask are even etymologically connected. According to Skeat, 
the Arabic word maskharat means “a buffoon, a fool, a jester, droll 
wag” (“Mask”). It is impossible for the fool to separate himself from the 
mask. And while the other fool characters like Edgar and Kent, for 
example, play the fool or wear the mask for a time, the Fool wears the 
mask permanently; he is the mask he wears, insofar as any 
consideration of the fool involves a recollection that the fool is not 
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 what he seems to be. Everything about the Fool affirms his union with 
the mask: in appearance, he wears motley, and in speech, he uses 
enigmatic phrases and jingles. The Fool’s relationship with the mask is 
persistent in Lear. The mask manifests the dialogic nature of the fools, 
but there are other ways in which this plural nature is perceived. Many 
fools in Lear demonstrate the fool’s dialogic nature as a precondition 
for a potential metamorphosis of conditions, of persons, and of 
environments. 
Examples of the tendency towards the dialogic can be seen 
throughout King Lear, and even in its ending. After Lear’s death, the 
survivors mournfully set about arranging the new authority of the 
kingdom. One expects that only a single character will assume or be 
offered the late king’s power, but here—in a moment not repeated in 
Shakespeare—Albany proposes that the government be shared. Each 
king has always enjoyed total monarchical power, but now the dialogic 
spirit attempts to break that tradition for the sake of community when 
Albany suggests that Kent and Edgar share the power and authority of 
the kingdom: 
 EDGAR.     He [Lear] is gone indeed. 
 KENT.  The wonder is he hath endured so long. 
       He but usurped his life. 
 ALBANY.  Bear them from hence. Our present business 
    Is general woe. [To Kent and Edgar] Friends of my soul, you 
twain 
    Rule in this realm and the gored state sustain. (5.3.289-294) 
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 Kent declines the proposal (“I have a journey, sir, shortly to go: / My 
master calls me; I must not say no” [5.3.295-6]), but the inclination for 
multiplicity remains.  
Earlier, Cordelia demonstrates her own capacity for change, a sign 
of dialogism insofar as change allows for multiple options. Cordelia 
allows Kent to do as he wishes after she lightly commands him to 
remove his mask; she thinks he no longer needs its protection. Kent, 
however, does not think that the time is right and implores Cordelia to 
reconsider:  
Pardon, dear madam.  
Yet to be known shortens my made intent.  
My boon I make it that you know me not  
Till time and I think meet. (4.6.8-11) 
 
Cordelia does not press the matter, nor does she try to enforce her 
will: without thinking, she forfeits her initial request and quickly moves 
on to another matter: “Then be’t so, my good lord. — How does the 
king?” (4.6.12). Cordelia’s word is not fixed and hardened, and moves 
beyond the self; it is relational and expansive. 
 One of the most surprising dialogic sequences in King Lear 
involves the interplay of nothing and nothingness that is so central to 
the text; this interplay complements the nothing/everything union 
within the fool. While nothingness has been a major focus of critical 
attention, rarely has it been viewed in the light of a dialogic pattern. 
First, the word “nothing” is passed—almost playfully—from character 
to character, and becomes, strangely enough, something that connects 
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 them. Cordelia, of course, initiates the dialogue centred on 
nothingness, but Lear instantly joins in: 
 LEAR.   What can you say to draw  
    A third more opulent than your sisters? Speak. 
 CORDELIA.  Nothing, my lord. 
 LEAR.  Nothing? 
 CORDELIA.  Nothing. 
 LEAR.  Nothing will come of nothing, speak again. (1.1.80-85) 
 
Lear continues the theme when he refuses to give Burgundy any dowry 
for marrying Cordelia: “Nothing, I have sworn; I am firm” (1.1.240). 
This dialogue of nothingness is resumed by Gloucester and Edmond 
when Edmond pretends to try to hide a letter supposedly written by 
Edgar, which Edmond has himself written: 
 GLOUCESTER.  Edmond, how now? What news? 
 EDMOND.  So please your lordship, none. [Putting up the letter]
  
 GLOUCESTER.  Why so earnestly seek you to put up that letter? 
 EDMOND.  I know no news, my lord. 
 GLOUCESTER.  What paper were you reading? 
 EDMOND.  Nothing, my lord. 
GLOUCESTER.  No? What needed then that terrible dispatch of it into 
your       
   pocket? The quality of nothing hath not such need to hide itself. 
Let’s 
   see. Come, if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles. (1.2.26-
35) 
 
The first dialogue between Cordelia and Lear certainly has profound 
and unforeseeable consequences, but in any other context this 
dialogue, and especially its sequel between Edmond and Gloucester, 
contains the pattern of banter found in almost any comedy show. 
Abbott and Costello’s classic comedy routine Who s On First? ’
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 epitomizes the generative interplay of repetition and 
misunderstanding.  
While there are many more instances in which characters speak of 
nothing, it is the equivalence of nothingness between Cordelia and the 
Fool that is most striking. Critics have often noticed the connection 
between Cordelia and the Fool, a relationship that stands out even 
though they are never scripted on stage together. Whether or not it is 
true, as some critics have asserted, that both characters were played 
by the same actor, they are complementary and have a unified 
structural force: “so far as this balance is concerned, Cordelia and the 
Fool function as one character. Never in the struggle at the same time, 
they serve really as one component force” (Stroup 129). And the Fool’s 
“identification with Cordelia . . . is suggested in the play even before 
his initial appearance on stage, when his absence (from the king’s 
presence) is linked to Cordelia’s absence (from Britain)” (Doloff 19): 
 LEAR.    But where’s my Fool? I have not seen him these two 
days. 
KNIGHT.  Since my young lady’s going into France, sir, the fool hath 
much 
   pined away. (1.4.60-63) 
 
There are many other connections between Cordelia and the Fool: 
Wronged and hurt, the innocent Fool, nevertheless, remains 
faithful to his master, seeing beyond the old man’s folly and 
unhesitatingly suffering with him. Likewise Cordelia, having heard 
of Lear’s plight, returns only to save her father and for no other 
reason. . . . Her whole interest centres on his redemption. (Stroup 
130)  
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 Both Cordelia and the Fool, not just Cordelia alone, are centred on 
Lear’s redemption; the Fool’s bitter criticism, which some critics 
interpret as plain meanness, is as important to the king’s eventual 
healing as Cordelia’s soothing presence is in the end. Each fool does 
his or her part in this “dialogue of healing” for Lear. But no connection 
is quite as striking between Cordelia and the Fool as nothingness. 
Rarely has the Fool’s apparently abrupt and unforeseeable departure 
halfway through the play been connected to Cordelia’s initial response 
to her father. But these two characters that “function as one 
component force” are so unified that the spoken word of one becomes 
the action of the other: Cordelia speaks nothing; and the Fool becomes 
nothing.   
 The Fool’s disappearance halfway through the dramatic action has 
been much debated. Mark Berge, for example, holds that the Fool’s 
last line that signals his departure (“And I’ll go to bed at noon” 
[3.6.41]) “expresses his despair in watching his master succumb to the 
seeming madness of the heath” (220). Other critics hold that the Fool 
leaves not out of despair, but out of selfishness; either he does not 
wish to subject himself to the harsh conditions on the heath or he 
does not care any more for his master and so departs. Gareth Lloyd 
Evans, for example, holds that Lear’s Fool is the coldest of 
Shakespeare’s fools and that his spontaneous disappearances and 
reappearances are inexcusable: 
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 Lear’s Fool is the most removed of all. He darts in and out of the 
play with his wry comments, his unremarked wisdom and 
warnings, his saws and jingles which seem to come from a time 
before clock-time began. When he is no longer dramatically 
needed he disappears from the action with utter finality. (149) 
 
Evans sees the Fool first as a flighty eccentric, and then as simply a 
primitive instrument of the drama. Other critics hold that the Fool’s 
emotional involvement is, in fact, his most outstanding quality. Bente 
A. Videbæk writes that the clown shares similar qualities, like truth-
telling, with other fools, but his emotional sensitivity is new: “the 
clown as truth-teller is no new thing in Shakespeare, but a genuinely 
sad clown is” (124). On one hand, the Fool is seen as “most removed of 
all,” and on the other, as “genuinely sad.” This latter discovery of 
emotional involvement makes it possible to see that the Fool’s 
departure is not a distant or a selfish act at all but one of the greatest 
acts of courage—a Kierkegaardian leap of faith—in the whole play. The 
Fool’s departure is thus connected with the word of Cordelia, and 
much more.   
The Fool is governed by his own inner laws that are much different 
from those for the non-fool; this unique standing is all the more 
understandable when we recall that the fool represents “a certain form 
of life which was real and ideal at the same time” (Bakhtin Rabelais 8; 
see page 24 above). In a statement that contradicts his original 
judgment on the Fool, Evans writes that “[i]nside the Fool there lies a 
mystery about which all we can instinctively say . . . is that it has 
 39
 something to do with a knowledge and sometimes a purpose which is 
exclusive to the Fool” (153 emphasis added). The Fool’s motivations 
are perfectly exclusive, and difficult, therefore, to understand. One 
thing that is clear is that a certain quality of tracelessness surrounds 
him; the Fool’s steps leave no footprints. After the Fool departs 
conclusively, he is hardly mentioned again. He thus seems to come and 
go according to wind-like inner impulses. Actually, the word “fool” is 
usually derived from the Latin word follis, which means “a pair of 
bellows, wind-bag; pl. folles, puffed cheeks; whence the term was 
easily transferred to a jester” (Skeat “Fool”). The image of the puffed 
cheeks emphasizes the fool’s connection with the wind and, thus, with 
all that is carefree, spontaneous, and spirited. But the connection also 
carries another, more sexually charged meaning:  
Ernest Weekley . . . carries further the derivation of “fool” from the 
Latin follis, which he defines as “bellows, windbag, but probably 
here in the specific sense of scrotum; cf. It. coglione, ‘a noddie, a 
foole, a patch, a dolt, a meacock’ (Florio), lit. testicle; also L. gerro, 
fool, from a Sicilian name for pudendum.” One could also compare 
the obscene oath “ballocks!” or “balls!”—testicles—meaning 
“nonsense!” or “silly pretension!” Weekley’s derivation is in keeping 
with the exaggerated sexuality of many clowns and fools 
throughout history. (Willeford 11) 
 
The fool, therefore, is linked directly with that which is of the spirit—
for the wind “which ‘bloweth where it listeth’ (John 3:8), is one of the 
most archaic representations of spirit”—and that which is of the flesh 
(10). The latter sexually-laden qualities are not foreign to the Fool: 
many of his comments are charged with sexual innuendo. The Fool’s 
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 song of advice to Lear, Danby comments, is a condensed Rake’s 
Progress (111). The Fool uses apparently benign images to warn of 
sexual license: 
 The codpiece that will house 
    Before the head has any, 
 The head and he shall louse; 
    So beggars marry many. 
 The man that makes his toe 
    What he his heart should make, 
 Shall of a corn cry woe, 
    And turn his sleep to wake.  (3.2.25-32) 
 
Again and again, the Fool refers to the foot as the place of humiliation 
and repudiation.  Halio interprets the passage as warning against 
sexual licentiousness: 
In the first quatrain the Fool comments on the danger of the 
sexual appetite overcoming prudence; i.e. reckless fornication 
leads to forced marriages, beggary, and disease. The second 
quatrain comments on another foolish inversion of values that 
eventually leads to misery. . . . The Fool alludes to Lear’s favouring 
of Gonerill and Regan over Cordelia, but he also continues the 
theme of sexual license contrasted with real love. (176) 
 
At the same time, the Fool’s nature is filled with a spirituality that is 
manifested in the gusty unpredictability of his movements. This 
tempestuous nature of the fool fulfills what Jaques, who longs to be a 
fool (“O that I were a fool!” [2.7.42]), declares to the Duke when he 
says that he desires freedom like the wind: “I must have liberty / 
Withal, as large a charter as the wind, / To blow on whom I please, for 
so fools have” (As You Like It 2.7.47-9).*3 Jaques identifies the fool’s 
                                                 
i
3  As You Like It offers an illuminating precedent for Lear, with striking similarities to 
be found between the texts: “[d]ifferent as it is from As You L ke It in tone, Lear is 
more like that comedy in the way it suspends the urgencies of plot, at least for the 
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 need for wind-like liberty, and Lear’s Fool embodies that liberty. The 
Fool’s breezy appearances and disappearances are certainly 
unpredictable, but this does not mean they are manifestations of 
selfish motivations.   
 It is as likely to suppose that the Fool does not wish to leave his 
tormented master, but something tells him he must go; if the Fool 
resisted this impulse, the situation would be worse for it. This 
disruptive figure who seems to break every rule may actually be under 
the greatest obedience. Many verses addressed to Orpheus in Rilke’s 
Sonnets for Orpheus apply also to the Fool on this topic of obedience 
and can help us to understand the Fool’s motivation to leave. In this 
sonnet, the pronoun he (er) refers of course to Orpheus, but if we 
change the antecedent to the Fool, the new application is fruitful: 
 O wie er schwinden muβ, daβ ihrs begrifft! 
 Und wenn ihm selbst auch bangte, daβ er schwände. 
 Indem sein Wort das Hiersein übertrifft, 
 
 ist er schon dort, wohin ihrs nicht begleitet. 
 Der Leier Gitter zwängt ihm nicht die Hände. 
 Und er gehorcht, indem er überschreitet. (1.5.9-14)4
 
Only in breaking the rules, or in overstepping the bounds is the Fool 
obedient. The Fool does not overstep the torn landscape out of 
                                                                                                                                                
protagonist, and allows time for philosophical discussion, role-playing, and the 
expanding of perspectives” (Snyder 143). 
 
4  Though he himself is afraid to disappear, 
 he has to vanish: don’t you understand? 
 The moment his word moves out beyond our life here,  
 
 he has gone where you will never find his trace. 
 The lyre’s strings do not constrict his hands. 
 And it is in overstepping that he obeys.  (1.5.9-14) 
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 selfishness or refusal, but rather in obedience to the obscure impulses 
that govern his world.  
 There are more ways in which knowledge of Orpheus helps us to 
understand not only the Fool’s strange and seemingly erratic 
behaviour, but also his intricate nature. In addition to their shared and 
characteristic obedience, both Orpheus and the Fool are lyricists, 
poets, and singers. Orpheus of course is famously depicted with his 
lyre, but the Fool—like all Robert Armin’s fools—is known also for his 
song. In the film version of Lear directed by Grigori Kozintsev, the Fool 
is “associated . . . with music, specifically with playing a small wooden 
flute” (Johnston). And it is the Fool’s music heard above the torn 
landscape, as opposed to the stark, desolate wasteland of Peter 
Brook’s production, that ends the play:  
In the closing moments of the play, we hear the Fool playing his 
music above the desolation, and as he plays, we see the crowds of 
people . . . slowly and tentatively start to pick up things and move 
towards the beginning of some reconstruction. (Johnston) 
 
Even though the Fool does not speak the last words of the play, the 
sound of his music is what endures every event and every word. 
Sustaining the linkage between the Fool and music, as Kozintsev does, 
strengthens the connection between the Fool and Cordelia. In the 
scene in which Lear awakes to newness of mind in the presence of his 
beloved fool Cordelia, music is given an especial function. The music, 
softly playing, comes to prominence when the Doctor instructs, 
“[l]ouder the music there!” (4.7.24).* Music is thus associated with 
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 healing, and specifically the healing powers of the fool, signified by 
Cordelia’s presence and her medicinal words:  
 O my dear father, restoration hang 
 Thy medicine on my lips, and let this kiss 
 Repair those violent harms that my two sisters 
 Have in thy reverence made. (4.7.25-8)* 
 
Such fond hopes and gestures make an imperfect attempt to salve the 
abused world and its inmates.  
 It is Orpheus’ descent into the underworld that is particularly 
relevant to the Fool. Actually the notion of the journey manifested for 
Orpheus as a descent and return is relevant to the Fool. This journey 
down and back is a “movement promulgated in madness” (Patterson 
17). And it is “madness [that] announces the need to set out, even 
though we know not where to go” (17). The inextricable position of 
madness in the journey pattern is more than slightly relevant to Lear, 
the centre of which—the hovel scene—features the ultimate locus of 
madness in Shakespeare. Lear remains for a time in this underworld; 
the Fool departs perforce alone. While space is limited for the study of 
the hero, the journey and all they entail, what is needed here, on a 
purely symbolic level, are the two mentioned movements of descent or 
departure and return, and also the change that accompanies them, for 
inevitably any character who ventures on a journey or adventure 
changes in some form, however subtle. 
 On a deeper level, though, Orpheus and the Fool do not go on a 
journey, as it were, and return changed. They, unlike most characters, 
 44
 actually live in change.  This is why the Fool’s departure, like Orpheus’, 
as Rilke tells us, is not something to be mourned, for the Fool, like 
Orpheus, ives in transformation, and whenever there is change, there 
is the Fool (or Orpheus): 
l
                                                
 Errichtet keinen Denkstein. Laβt die Rose 
 nur jedes Jahr zu seinen Gunsten blühn. 
 Denn Orpheus ists. Seine Metamorphose 
 in dem und dem. Wir sollen uns nicht mühn 
 
 um andre Namen. Ein für alle Male 
 ists Orpheus, wenn es singt. Er kommt and geht. 
 Ists nicht schon viel, wenn er die Rosenschale 
 um ein paar Tage manchmal übersteht? (1.5.1-8 emphasis added)5
 
Rilke tells us that Orpheus is metamorphosis, and this insight applies 
to the Fool—he too is metamorphosis. With this connection between 
the Fool and change, as with the earlier connection between the fool 
and the container or mask, two different states are equated: a 
character and an abstract notion. But the Fool does not cease to be the 
Fool even when he takes on abstract meanings, a development which, 
as Lothian once declared, is part of “the greatness of this play” (see 
page 19 above). And the ideal aspect of the fool allows for, even 
demands, a symbolic interpretation. 
 
5   
Erect no gravestone for him. Only this: 
 let the rose blossom each year for his sake. 
 For it is the god. His metamorphosis 
 in this and that.  We do not need to look 
 
 for other names. It is Orpheus once for all 
 whenever there is song. He comes and goes. 
 Isn’t it enough if sometimes he can dwell 
 with us a few days longer than a rose? (1.5.1-8) 
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  The Fool, who is the mask, is also transformation, for the “mask is 
connected with the joy of change and reincarnation” (Bakhtin Rabelais 
38). The mask is also “related to transition, metamorphosis, and 
familiar nicknames. It contains the playful element of life” (38). And 
King Lear, if anything, is a drama about the transformation of a 
“majesty [who] falls to folly” (1.1.143). The king’s metamorphosis from 
mighty ruler to stripped madman to redeemed and repentant father is 
the central development in the play. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the image of the mask, which represents the fool’s journey into the 
unknown, gains central prominence in this play.  
 The Fool departs at the height of madness from the hovel, which 
will soon gain symbolic significance: in leaving, the Fool, who 
embodies transformation, demonstrates the movement central to this 
reality (Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan). The movement is literal and 
symbolic, for the Fool who literally whisks in and out of the play also 
symbolizes the hidden movement of inner change that is played out in 
his ailing master, as we shall see. The Fool’s connectedness to 
journeying or traveling is why he, like Foucault’s madman, can be 
called “the Passenger par excellence” (Foucault 11). The fool’s life is, 
for better or for worse, just that—a passage or journey. He lives only in 
the travelling, and belongs neither to the land from which he departs 
nor the land to which he is navigating: “[h]e has his truth and his 
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 homeland only in that fruitless expanse between two countries that 
cannot belong to him” (11).  
 The image of the journey, and the fool’s journey specifically, is 
manifested in Lear in the image of the sea-venture or sailing. Fittingly, 
in the Renaissance, one of the most popular vehicles that emphasized 
this movement of the fool’s voyage was the ship:  
Something new appears in the imaginary landscape of the 
Renaissance; soon it will occupy a privileged place there: the Ship 
of Fools, a strange “drunken boat” that glides along the calm rivers 
of the Rhineland and the Flemish canals. (Foucault 7) 
 
There actually existed these ships in Renaissance Europe that gathered 
onto their decks all the wandering madmen who had been driven 
beyond the city limits, even though it is “not easy to discover the exact 
meaning of this custom” (8-9). It is plausible, and even likely, that this 
method of ridding cities of unwanted deranged men was the 
inspiration for a host of literary works in which the main setting was a 
sea vessel: 
Symphorien Champier composes a Ship of Princes and Battles of 
Nobility in 1502, then a Ship of Virtuous Ladies in 1503; there is 
also a Ship of Health, alongside the Blauwe Schute of Jacob van 
Oestvoren in 1413, Sebastian Brandt’s Narrenschiff (1494), and the 
work of Josse Bade: Stultiferae naviculae scaphae fatuarum 
mulierum (1498). (8) 
 
These works portrayed a “great symbolic voyage which would bring 
them [the voyagers], if not fortune, then at least the figure of their 
destiny or their truth” (8). The destiny or the truth for the fool is found 
in the symbolic image of travelling, which epitomizes his interior 
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 landscape, and exterior action. The imagery of sailing and sea-faring 
is significant for Lear: Caroline F. E. Spurgeon notes that three of the 
most-used images in Shakespeare “under [the category of] ‘nature’ 
[are] the sea, ships, and seafaring” (47). And thus, the image that will 
represent this “great symbolic journey” towards a truth that is found in 
transformation and passage is the sea-vessel that captured the 
imagination of Renaissance thinkers. 
 The image of sea-faring with all of its symbolic implications in 
Lear comes in an unexpected place—not on the sea, but within the 
hovel. The hovel becomes connected, therefore, with the symbolic 
image of the journey. But one wants to ask: how are these two notions 
connected? There are many levels of meanings surrounding the image 
of the small refuge from the storm. On its most superficial level, the 
hovel serves as a protective barrier from the raging tempest. Second, 
on a metaphoric level, the nonsense that reigns within the hovel 
expresses Lear’s own dementia. Every character within is connected to 
madness. The Fool, who does not obey the standard set of social codes 
of behaviour, is often seen as mad by nature, even though the reader 
knows that there is genius behind the Fool’s words; Edgar and Kent 
have assumed the disguises of madmen named Poor Tom and Caius 
respectively; and Lear is mad through and through. Also, the 
dialogues, or simultaneous monologues, reflect Lear’s fragmented 
mind. As nowhere else in Shakespeare, when the characters finally 
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 reside within the shelter, for over forty lines articulation and response 
do not meet, and all coherent communication seems shattered. The 
utterances within the hovel, instead of meeting their mark, seem rather 
to ricochet in chaos’ abyss: 
 EDGAR.  Frateretto calls me, and tells me Nero is an angler in the 
lake of    
       darkness. Pray, innocent, and beware the foul fiend. 
 FOOL.  Prithee, nuncle, tell me whether a madman be a gentleman 
or a      
    yeoman. 
 LEAR.  A king, a king! 
 FOOL.  No, he’s a yeoman that has a gentleman to his son; for he’s 
a mad      
      yeoman that sees his son a gentleman before him. 
 LEAR.  To have a thousand with red burning spits 
    Come hizzing in upon ’em! 
 EDGAR.  Bless thy five wits. (3.6.6-15) 
 
Lear is mad through and through, which not even he denies, for he 
declares that a madman is none other than “a king, a king!” (3.6.10). 
And the miscommunication can be seen, from one perspective, to 
represent Lear’s misfiring brain. The hovel scene is often seen as the 
climax of the play, its status as the centre of perfect chaos and 
madness noted by G. Wilson Knight:  
The core of the play is an absurdity, and indignity, an incongruity. 
In no tragedy of Shakespeare do incident and dialogue so 
recklessly and miraculously walk the tight-rope of our pity over 
the depths of bathos and absurdity.” (92) 
 
The madness that is structurally central to the play, infuses the play 
with meaning, as we shall see.  
 Finally, in a way that does not discount the other two 
interpretations, the hovel takes on symbolic implications by the 
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 striking contrast between the internal and external atmospheres. 
Indeed, if one were to define a mask, one might do so not by focusing 
on the border or mask itself, but by describing the mask’s effect on 
space: it creates distinct spheres of space, an outer sphere and an 
inner. In this regard, many ordinary things are like masks: an emptied 
egg shell, a snail shell, a cave—the list, redolent of the Fool’s 
discourses, is endless. Many of these images that emphasize inner and 
outer spaces are found in Lear. While not every image or object of such 
definition gains symbolic meaning, the hovel does gain greater 
significance by its prominent position in the play; the hovel is at the 
very centre of one of the most intensely charged and symbolic scenes 
in all of Shakespeare. Every character in the meaningful scene that 
enters the shelter wears a mask. Thus the hovel image that also 
juxtaposes interior and exterior space ripens with meaning. While 
darkness, rain, and violent winds dominate outdoors, warmth and 
dryness are at least anticipated, if not provided, indoors. Within the 
refuge, Kent hopes that Lear will find respite, even though we know no 
benign rest is found here. Nevertheless, the tension between inner and 
outer realms places the image of the hovel directly in the domain of 
the mask, the Silenus figure, and the Fool, all of which open to reveal a 
very different inner landscape than what might be assumed from their 
external presentation. If one sees the hovel as symbolic of the mask, 
the occurrences within the mask will reveal the actual mechanics, as it 
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 were, of the mask, an opportunity for revelation that is not repeated in 
King Lear.  
 Edgar reveals the most important clue about these mechanics in 
the first line he utters. When Edgar stumbles out of the hovel as if in a 
panic, he yells out: “Fathom and half, fathom and half” (3.4.37). While 
this at first seems like a meaningless line, it quickly gains significance 
when we realize that “fathom and half” is a “sailor’s cry; the hovel is 
shipping water” (Riverside 1324). If Edgar utters a sailor’s cry, the 
hovel, therefore, to follow the image through, becomes a capsizing 
ship. And since we have already stated that the hovel symbolizes the 
mask, the mask and the ship, therefore, become comparable. One 
could conclude that going into the mask is equivalent to going on a 
journey, a journey that is interior. For Orpheus the journey pattern 
manifests in a descent into the underworld. The fool’s descent into 
this refuge is analogous to Orpheus’ or Aeneas’—or Clarence’s—trip 
into Hades, although what is gained from each descent is strikingly 
different.   
 In this way, the hovel becomes Shakespeare’s version of The Ship 
of Fools, exploding with folly. And since the pattern of the journey 
involves transformation, so would descending into madness involve 
this inevitable change. Lear does enter into madness. Lear is quite far 
gone when he is shown without his kingly robes, but wearing only 
what nature can provide; he is “fantastically dressed with flowers” 
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 (4.6.80 s.d.). Earlier Lear recognizes that he is succumbing to the 
madness: “My wits begin to turn,” (3.2.65). But, this recognition seems 
to produce a new concern for the other. After he asserts that his “wits 
begin to turn,” Lear focuses for the first time not only on himself, but 
on others too, and thus, Lear’s word, to use Bakhtin’s vocabulary, 
becomes dialogic. Right after Lear tells us that there has been some 
shift within himself, he immediately enquires into the condition of the 
Fool: “Come on, my boy.  How dost, my boy? Art cold?” (3.2.66). And 
when the group finally enters the hovel, Lear is not concerned about 
precedence. As king, Lear would certainly assume first position, but he 
is content to go in last. Now he places the well-being of others before 
his own:    
KENT.    Good my lord, enter here. 
LEAR.  Prithee, go in thyself, seek thine own ease.  
   This tempest will not give me leave to ponder  
   On things would hurt me more; but I’ll go in.  
   In, boy, go first. You houseless poverty —  
   Nay, get thee in; I’ll pray, and then I’ll sleep. (3.4.23-7) 
The image of Lear entering last recalls the Gospel: “many who are first 
will be last, and the last will be first” (Matt. 19:30). Lear wants his 
surrounding kin to be comforted from the storm, and to “seek [their] 
own ease.” Even Lear’s relationship with the gods has changed. In his 
fury at the beginning, Lear calls upon the gods only to seal an oath 
against Cordelia, or to curse his unforgiving daughters. Now, on the 
heath, Lear is calm with and generous to his crew, and it would follow 
that he calls upon the gods for reasons other than negative ones: “Nay, 
 52
 get thee in; I’ll pray, and then I’ll sleep” (3.4.27). Lear has been 
preserved from his own anger, and he is simply able to release himself 
from all that previously caused his rage. 
 Lear does finally wake to total sanity in Cordelia’s presence, having 
purged his mind’s chaos. Lear, in his speech to Cordelia, becomes the 
prototype of the gentle and repentant man who recognizes his 
foolishness: 
  Pray do not mock me: 
 I am a very foolish, fond old man, 
 Fourscore and upward, 
 Not an hour more nor less; and to deal plainly, 
 I fear I am not in my perfect mind. 
 Methinks I should know you and know this man; 
 Yet I am doubtful: for I am mainly ignorant 
 What place this is, and all the skill I have 
 Remembers not these garments, nor I know not 
 Where I did lodge last night. Do not laugh at me, 
 For, as I am a man, I think this lady 
 To be my child Cordelia. ( 4.6.56-67) 
 
Lear enters into madness and temporarily becomes a fool. With the aid 
of other masked fools and madness, he embarks on the fool’s journey 
into the unknown. It is not literally that Lear’s entrance into the hovel 
changes him, for the hovel is only symbolic of a deeper process: the 
entrance into the madness and the change that took place because of 
this entrance. The aspect of travelling involved with the mask and with 
madness is why Lear’s “madness becomes, in fact, his route to sanity” 
(Ryans 257 emphasis added). A brief look at the signification of 
water, which is inseparable from the image of sailing, will clarify this 
process. Water has infinite symbolic possibilities. Water is often 
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 symbolic of madness: “water and madness have long been linked in 
the dreams of European man” (Foucault 12). Thus, the madness in the 
hovel scene is additionally stressed by the references to water. As 
mentioned above, the first reference is Edgar’s “Fathom and half, 
fathom and half” (3.4.37). Later, the image of water with its 
implications of madness is emphasized again when Edgar announces 
that “Nero is an angler in the lake of darkness” (3.6.6-7). The Emperor 
Nero “fiddled while Rome burned and is imagined condemned to hell 
for many crimes against his family and the Empire,” and is, therefore, 
associated with extreme degrees of guilt (Halio 193). The magnitude of 
this guilt is revealed in the waters that have grown black with blame. 
Lear’s own dark waters of bitterness and remorse are in great need of 
purification. While water has a destructive side which manifests 
intensely in the storm that breaks down the mind, it also connotes 
baptism, initiation, purity and renewal. Water can be a means of 
purification: “water is the face of the deep that summons the deep 
within, the medium and passage of purification” (Foucault 18). 
Entering into the hovel’s symbolic landscape with its purgative water 
has a renewing and purifying effect on Lear. After journeying into the 
madness and going through it, Lear returns to newness on the other 
side: “like Christ going into and emerging from the wilderness, the 
madman embarks for and returns on the other side” (Patterson 16). 
And after his passage through madness, Lear too meets forgiveness, 
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 health, and renewal. Thus the static image of the container or mask, 
gains dynamism and movement, and becomes the actual vehicle for 
change. And insofar as the Fool, a character or being, embodies the 
mask and enacts, Orpheus-like, metamorphosis, he initiates 
transformation—a rite of passage even. Characters who enter into the 
mask, who embark on an inner journey, manifest change eventually; 
the real movement, therefore, happens behind the mask; the real 
movement happens within.  
 Thus the space within the fool and within madness becomes the 
actual space where change happens. In this way, the mask becomes 
the alchemical oven in which change can occur. Characters enter into 
this sphere of dialogism behind the mask and become “potentially 
plural” (see page 33 above). Thus, the state behind the mask is one of 
potentiality, in which lies the possibility for newness, and the freedom 
found in possibility itself. In donning the mask, and particularly the 
mask of madness, characters provide themselves with the greatest 
possibilities, at least within, and avoid being fixed or trapped by the 
alazon figures. Lear of course does not wear the mask of madness, but 
is totally nonsensical. Madness, with its unpredictable, responsive, and 
changeable nature, is the greatest state of potentiality, and the state 
which allows, therefore, for the possibility for change: 
In an overflow of meaning by nonsense, madness penetrates the 
horizon of what is defined by common discourse to open up a 
realm of unlimited possibility. Here lies its power of revelation: it 
is the power of possibility. When madness introduces its alien 
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 discourse, truth is cast in terms of possibility—and therefore of 
freedom—rather than necessity. (Patterson 14) 
 
The mask of madness also offers Kent and Edgar this freedom; unlike 
Lear, they do not need or desire transformation. Edgar and Kent 
assume the mask first for self-preservation, and second to save father 
and master respectively. It is important to remember that the power of 
change may be found within the mask. Lear’s madness signals the 
need for freedom from fixedness, which is possibility, and for change. 
 Moreover, Lear confirms the necessity of potentiality for change. 
After Lear roars the charged line, “Crack nature’s moulds” (3.2.8), what 
follows immediately explains what happens when these molds, 
dramatic and otherwise, are cracked: “all germens spill at once” 
(3.2.8). “Germen” means a seed, a hope, a possibility. And the chaos in 
the hovel—and in the mask—indicates that here, at this climactic point 
of madness, all germens are, indeed, spilling at once without restraint. 
Thus, in terms of genre, one consequence of the union of tragedy and 
comedy is infinite potentiality. This point of change, the space of 
potentiality within the mask is an undefined, nameless space, a turning 
point: 
 Wolle die Wandlung. O sei für die Flamme begeistert, 
 drin sich ein Ding dir entzieht, das mit Verwandlungen prunkt; 
 jener entwerfende Geist, welcher das Irdische meistert, 
liebt in dem Schwung der Figur nichts wie den wendenden Punkt. 
(Rilke 2.12.1-4 emphasis added)6
                                                 
6  Will transformation. Oh be inspired for the flame 
in which a Thing disappears and bursts into something else; 
the spirit of re-creation which masters this earthly form 
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Lear must move to this wendenden Punkt or “pivoting point.” Lear 
enters upon the madness, the pivoting point where he is “no longer 
[himself]” and only after this entrance can he burst “into something 
else.” The Fool occupies this turning point, this sphere of possibilities 
perpetually, which is why he is so responsive and changeable. This 
point of change is an undefined, nameless space; hence Fool lacks a 
name.  
 Lear, of course, in entering into the madness, does not know 
where he is going, or if he will ever return. He enters into this 
metaphorical darkness, and is, therefore, blind to the future. He does 
not determine the direction of his future, but he is, rather, led by 
madness to life and redemption. The notion that Lear who is blind to 
his future is led to safety by madness is fulfilled by the scene where 
Edgar, disguised in madness, leads his father, Gloucester, literally 
blind, whose mind, like Lear’s, is overgone by monologic despair: 
 GLOUCESTER.  Come hither, fellow. 
 EDGAR.    . . . — Bless thy sweet eyes, they bleed. 
 GLOUCESTER.  Know’st thou the way to Dover? 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 EDGAR.  Ay, master. 
 GLOUCESTER.  There is a cliff whose high and bending head 
    Looks fearfully in the confinèd deep. 
    Bring me but to the very brim of it, 
    And I’ll repair the misery thou dost bear 
    With something rich about me. From that place 
    I shall no leading need. 
 EDGAR.       Give me thy arm. 
                                                                                                                                                
 loves most the pivoting point where you are no longer yourself. (2.12.1-4; 
emphasis added) 
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     Poor Tom shall lead thee. (4.1.53-5, 67-74) 
 
In this symbolically charged scene of leading and following, assuming 
a mask—the madness assumed by Edgar—leads to safety and health, 
for Gloucester, who is also mad, but in a different way, is in need of 
protection. Gloucester’s madness is not shammed like Edgar’s, but is 
instead a despairing one. In this scene, by contrasting the madness of 
Gloucester and Edgar, Shakespeare shows the varying kinds of 
madness.   
 As Erasmus had recognized almost a century earlier, frenzy and 
folly are near allied in their double aspect (Corti). The influence of 
Desiderius Erasmus (1467?-1536) on the Renaissance conception of 
folly is profound and deeply learned. His Moriae Encomium or The 
Praise of Folly (1509) focuses on the question of religious ecstasy and 
draws upon Plato, Philo, the gospels, the Pauline epistles, Origen, St. 
Ambrose and Theophylact. M.A. Screech writes that, in the end, The 
Praise of Folly is a “witty, erudite, sustained, and moving praise of a 
form of religious ecstasy which is indistinguishable from madness” 
(xvii). This type of madness, called here religious ecstasy, is different 
from the madness in the present discussion; it is nevertheless 
important to keep in mind that such a kind of madness brought on by 
a religious experience exists. Moreover, even Rabelais, whose 
Gargantua and Pantagruel, a novel of unprecedented folly, is known to 
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 have written a letter “to Erasmus in 1532, calling him his intellectual 
father and his intellectual mother” (Screech xiv).   
 For Erasmus, writes Corti, folly “represents the utmost, rarest 
relationship that everybody can retain with himself qua homo” (15). 
Thus, the uniqueness and idealness of Socrates comes from folly. 
There are two kinds of folly: foolish and wise: “[s]o on the one hand, 
we find the ‘foolish folly’ of folly which rejects the ‘wise folly’ of 
reason, and a wise folly which, in being rejected by a nonsensical folly, 
finds itself redoubled” (15). Corti’s distinction between “foolish folly” 
and “wise folly” reflects Erasmus’ “foolish madness” and “wise 
madness,” a reflection that shows that no distinctions need to be made 
in this regard between madness and folly, it being far more necessary 
to identify whether the madness/folly be foolish or wise. Erasmus in 
The Praise of Folly distinguishes these: 
But ye must understande, that there be two kyndes of madnesse. 
One is that rage, whiche the Furies of hell, beying punishers of the 
wicked, doe bringe with them, as often as thei graffe, and fasten 
inn the mindes of mortall men, either feruente desire of an uniust 
reuengement, or unsaciate couettousnesse of golde, or cursed and 
unleefull loue, or parentslaughter, or treason, with suche other 
plages sent by the iust iudgment of the gods, for the punisshying 
of misdooers. Or whan those Furies do trouble, and vexe the giltie 
conscience of a man, with the pricke of dredefull furiousnesse. But 
there is an other kynde of madness, farre unlike the former, which 
procedeth from me wholly, and most is to be embraced. As often 
as a certaine pleasant rauing, or errour of the mynde, deliuereth 
the herte of that man, whom it possesseth, from all wonted 
carefulnesse, and rendreth it dyuers waies, muche recreated with 
new delection. (52) 
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 Erasmus distinguishes between Edgar and Gloucester’s madness: 
Gloucester’s is foolish, while Edgar’s is wise. Gloucester wants to be 
led to the heights of Dover, or, to the isolated heights of madness, one 
could say. From this peak, Gloucester wants to commit the ultimate 
vainglorious act, the apex of monologic madness. With a crucial 
difference, Gloucester’s blind climb upon the cliff recalls the Arcanum 
of the trusting fool about to step off the edge in perfect faith that he 
will not be harmed. The dissimilarities of this situation to Gloucester’s 
are obvious. Unlike the fool, Gloucester mounts the precipice with 
heaviness of heart and spirit, from which he must be rescued by the 
redemptive mask of wise madness donned by his son Edgar as Poor 
Tom. Wise madness is what saves the foolishly despairing madman 
from death by his own hands. Wise folly leads Gloucester to safety and 
to life. 
 And yet there are characters in Lear who are not so fortunate as to 
be connected to the saving power of folly: Gonerill, for instance, whose 
situation is the antithesis of Gloucester’s. Gonerill, who represents the 
extreme form of the non-fool, is cut off from all that is life-giving, just 
as a tree that has become separated from its life-force, sap: 
 ALBANY.   I fear your disposition; 
    That nature which contemns it[s] origin 
    Cannot be bordered certain in itself. 
    She that herself will sliver and disbranch 
    From her material sap, perforce must wither, 
    And come to deadly use. (4.2.31-6)* 
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 Folly, then, is at least one component, perhaps even a major one, of 
the “material sap” of existence, and without which fluid aspect, it 
follows, the tree, or character would eventually dry up and harden. The 
symptoms of this petrification are prevalent, for Gonerill and other 
non-fools are given stone-like qualities. Gloucester first illustrates this 
rock-like image in the storm scene when he tells Lear to enter the 
shelter: “Go in with me. My duty cannot suffer / T’obey in all your 
daughters’ hard commands” (3.4.132-3). The daughters’ words are 
likened to stones, which shows their separation from folly’s life-force. 
The image is pushed further when, as Lear states, not only are Regan 
and Gonerill’s words hard, but so are their hearts: “Then let them 
anatomize Regan; see what breeds about her heart. Is there any cause 
in nature that makes these hard hearts?” (3.6.33-4). This emblematic 
rigidity of the non-fools, and the sisters, is the force opposite of the 
expansive and multiplying movement of the fools. The stiff and 
unchanging disposition of the sisters is more closely linked to what 
Bakhtin would call monologic. This monologic tendency of the sisters, 
though, surpasses even Bakhtin’s definition, as we shall see, for the 
movement that opposes expansion or explosion, is not fixedness, but 
implosion. And it is Gonerill who performs the act of the extreme form 
of implosion: suicide. Gonerill, who is cut off from the “material sap” 
has no connection to the saving power of wise folly, as Gloucester 
does. Both Lear and Gloucester certainly manifest “foolish folly,” but 
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 they are aided by or connected to the “material sap” of those who 
embody “wise folly,” like Kent, the Fool, and Edgar; Gonerill, though, is 
not connected to any character who embodies the life-saving wise 
folly. Madness disconnected from wisdom, therefore, is total 
madness.7 Gonerill, Regan, Cornwall, and Oswald too, therefore, are 
the only really mad characters in Lear.  
                                                 
7 The madness, or wise folly, of the fool, is described by St. Paul, who is himself 
referred to as a fool for Christ, when he writes of the folly of the cross, which folly is 
applicable to the fool on many levels: 
The message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us 
who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written:  
“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the learning of the learned I will set 
aside”. . .  
Has not God made the wisdom of the world foolish? For since in the wisdom of 
God the world did not come to know God through wisdom, it was the will of 
God through foolishness of the proclamation of save those who have faith . . . 
For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of 
God is stronger than human strength. (1 Corinthians 1:18-25) 
There are many other Fools of Christ: Gregory the Great, Scotus Erigena, Francis of 
Assisi, Thomas à Kempis with his Imitatio Christi, and Nicholas of Cusa who writes of 
the coincidence of knowledge and ignorance.   
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“A house to put ’s head in” 
  
 
The two movements that correspond with Lear’s divided and 
opposed companies proceed as follows. The first is one of increasingly 
outward manifestation that is both changeable and considerate of the 
other—this movement has been called expansion. The second, the 
topic of the present discussion, is characterized not by multiplicity, 
increase, and growth, but by singleness, reduction, and contraction—
this movement will be called implosion. The in-turning nature of the 
second movement is not to be confused with interiority or 
introspection, for it is rather a movement towards self-annihilation. 
While the fools have been called dialogic, the non-fools are monologic, 
and an image from the myth of Demeter captures the nature of the 
monologic word.  
Persephone, daughter of Demeter the god of fertility and the 
seasons, is abducted by the god of the underworld and made to 
remain in Hades. Persephone’s captivity grieves Demeter so greatly 
that she neglects one of her greatest responsibilities: the 
transformation of the seasons. The land soon becomes barren and 
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 unfruitful, a wasteland. This grief-stricken landscape needs 
rejuvenation. In The Homeric Hymn to Demeter, such renewal is 
triggered when Demeter in her sorrow travels to Eleusis and is 
unexpectedly made to laugh by a servant girl, Iambe:  
 Unsmiling, tasting neither food nor drink, 
 she sat wasting with desire for her deep-girt daughter, 
 until knowing Iambe jested with her and 
 mocking with many a joke moved the holy goddess 
to smile and laugh and keep a gracious heart — 
Iambe, who later pleased her moods as well. (qtd. in Sælid Gilhus 
34) 
 
The two landscapes, one of fertility and one of barrenness, are clearly 
contrasted, and the gateway between them, as Iambe demonstrates, is 
laughter. Significantly, Iambe is referred to as “athyroisin, ‘doorless’, 
and in a hymn to Demeter composed by the poet Philikos (3c BCE), 
Iambe says to Demeter, ‘If you are willing to loosen the bonds of your 
mourning, I can set you free’” (35). Thus the opening, freeing, and 
dialogic, that is, expansive, power of laughter is emphasized (35).  
The connection between laughter and fertility is brought to the 
forefront in another version of the Demeter myth, rendered by Clement 
of Alexandria in The Exhortation to the Greeks. In this version, it is 
Baubo, “not Iambe, who manage[s] to get the mourning Demeter to 
laugh” (Sælid Gilhus 34). Baubo’s strategy is more broadly stated than 
Iambe’s, and the connection between laughter and generation made 
more explicit, for, instead of telling a joke to make Demeter laugh, 
Baubo bares herself: 
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  This said, she drew aside her robes, and showed 
 A sight of shame; child Iacchus was there, 
 And laughing, plunged his hand below her breasts. 
 Then smiled the goddess, in her heart she smiled, 
And drank the draught from out the glancing cup. (qtd in Sælid 
Gilhus 34) 
 
Baubo’s name, like Iambe’s is significant, for it means vagina (34). The 
fool of course is akin to Iambe or Baubo, not only with his closeness to 
sexuality and to the body, but also with his dialogism and his tendency 
to break open situations and environments. The fool is, after all, the 
Lord of Misrule, who can shatter every border or convention for the 
sake of openness and freedom, even though Lear’s Fool has a more 
difficult time shattering Lear’s despair that threatens to destroy the 
king. This typically open and fertile aspect of the fool is contrasted 
with the closed and barren nature of the sisters. 
The sterile and closed (laughter-less) landscape of the sisters is 
easily detectable. One of Lear’s curses to Gonerill sums up all of the 
language of her barrenness. Even though the nature of a curse 
describes what is prospect and not what is present, the distance 
between this wish for barrenness and the reality of such a sterility 
might not be great—the corrupt and violent acts of the sisters are 
certainly not manifestations of a healthy inner world, but of an 
exceedingly damaged one. Although the curse is directed at Gonerill, it 
applies to Regan as well: 
Hear, Nature, hear, dear goddess, hear: 
Suspend thy purpose, if thou didst intend 
To make this creature fruitful. 
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 Into her womb convey sterility, 
Dry up in her the organs of increase, 
And from her derogate body never spring 
A babe to honour her. If she must teem, 
Create her child of spleen, that it may live 
And be a thwart disnatured torment to her. 
Let it stamp wrinkles in her brow of youth, 
With cadent tears fret channels in her cheeks, 
Turn all her mother’s pains and benefits 
To laughter and contempt, that she may feel 
How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it is 
To have a thankless child. (1.4.230-244) 
 
Thus, the daughters become the image of the anti-Demeter who has 
not only failed to produce life, but may yet create that which is a 
distortion of life, a “child of spleen.” The sisters are the antithesis of 
any feminine abundance or fruits of laughter. With their hard natures, 
they are absolutely without laughter. The location of the weeping 
Demeter helps us understand the daughters’ natures, for Demeter 
“who was agelastos, ‘without laughter’. . . ‘is sitting by the Agelastos 
Petras, ‘the rock without laughter’” (Sælid Gilhus 35). Those 
disconnected from the opening and life-giving force of folly become 
like the Agelastos Petras: frigid, hard, and humourless. 
 There is hardly a better image than the Agelastos Petras to 
describe what Bakhtin means when he speaks of that which is 
monologic. The monologic word is often found in the mouths of those 
with authority, because it manifests frequently in the form of a 
command, which seeks only one response—obedience (Patterson 9). 
The sisters possess this rigid word of authority once Lear imparts his 
power and wealth to them; he makes his daughters his mothers 
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 (1.4.133-4), and, even though he did not wish it, gave them authority 
(i.e. power) over him. Such authority, though, soon becomes as “cold, 
intractable, and unresponsive as an idol of stone” (Patterson 9). The 
fool’s capacity to counteract, or at least to save themselves from this 
movement towards solidification, as we shall see, is why Welsford 
declares that “one perennial function of the fool [is] the power of 
melting the solidity of the world” (223).   
The inflexibility of the daughters’ word is epitomized in the scene 
in which they strip Lear of his one hundred attendants, the last 
trappings of his former wealth and kingship. Whereas Cordelia is 
willing to let go of her initial request to Kent to remove his disguise, 
the sisters will not forfeit their request that Lear come to their houses 
unattended, even though Lear himself desperately wishes otherwise. 
Though Lear is obviously suffering at the hardness of the sisters, who 
pare away at his wealth and his mind, (“O sides, you are too tough!” 
[2.4.190 emphasis added]), they do not yield even slightly to their 
father:  
LEAR.  I can be patient, I can stay with Regan, 
   I and my hundred knights. 
 REGAN.      Not altogether so. 
    I looked not for you yet, nor am provided 
    For your fit welcome. Give ear, sir, to my sister, 
    For those that mingle reason with your passion 
    Must be content to think you old, and so — 
    But she knows what she does. 
 LEAR.       Is this well spoken? 
 REGAN.  I dare avouch it, sir. What, fifty followers? 
    Is it not well? What should you need of more? 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
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  GONERILL.  Why might not you, my lord, receive attendance 
    From those that she calls servants, or from mine? 
 REGAN.  Why not, my lord? If then they chanced to slack ye, 
    We could control them. If you will come to me 
    (For now I spy a danger) I entreat you 
    To bring but five and twenty; to no more 
    Will I give place or notice. 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 LEAR.  Those wicked creatures yet do look well-favoured 
    When others are more wicked. Not being the worst 
    Stands in some rank of praise. [To Gonerill] I’ll go with thee; 
    Thy fifty yet doth double five and twenty, 
    And thou art twice her love. 
 GONERILL.     Hear me, my lord: 
    What need you five and twenty? ten? or five? 
    To follow in a house where twice so many 
    Have a command to tend you? 
REGAN.         What need one? (2.4.223-31, 236-42, 
249-56) 
 
The sisters will not change their word; they are intractable. The image 
here is one of diminishment or paring down. According to the OED, “to 
pare” means “to reduce (a thing) by cutting or shaving away; hence to 
reduce to diminish little by little; to bring down to size or amount,” 
which is exactly what Gonerill and Regan do to Lear. The Fool actually 
calls the sisters “parings” (1.4.148). The monologic characters 
contribute an element of reduction rather than one of increase to the 
drama, and their acts of diminution derive from their limited 
perspective of the world. 
 The sisters view the world as an object, and not as living subject—
a perspective that, consequently, materializes everything. Thus, the 
sisters are likely not even conscious of their father’s suffering, for they 
are focused only on their own wills and desires. Because they cannot 
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 see the world beyond their own perspectives, their universe, like the 
monologic word, becomes an objectified, and thus materialized, 
reality: 
Monologism, at its extreme form, denies the existence outside 
itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal 
responsibilities, and I with equal rights (thou). With a monologic 
approach (in its extreme or pure form) another person remains 
wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another 
consciousness . . . Monologue manages without the other, and 
therefore to some degree materializes reality . . . It closes down 
the represented world and represented people. (Dostoevsky 293-4 
emphasis added) 
 
The monologue closes down the world by its narrow and confining 
perspective. And, in a presentiment of Martin Buber’s Ich and Du, 
Bakhtin shows that those who embody the monologic tendency do not 
even see others as human beings. For Buber, the I is irretrievably 
relational, that is, two-fold; the I cannot exist without the other. The 
other, though, can be approached as a living subject worthy of 
reverence (Thou) or as a material object (It): 
The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the 
twofold nature of the primary word which he speaks. 
  The primary words are not isolated words, but combined 
words. 
  The one primary word is the combination I-Thou. 
The other primary word is the combination I-It; wherein, 
without a change in the primary word, one of the words He and 
She can replace It. (Buber 3) 
 
A person, therefore, may be referred to as an object, It, with the I-It or 
monologic perspective. The sisters hardly approach the world with the 
I-Thou structure or even with a typical I-It perspective, which is cold 
certainly, but not aggressive. There is nothing passive about the way 
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 they wish to “[h]ang [Gloucester] instantly,” and “[p]luck out his eyes” 
(3.7.4-5) for his supposed crime of treason. Nor is there anything 
passive about the way they surround Lear and whittle away his fortune. 
Firmness and objectivity do not connote aggression; but the sisters are 
certainly more than these—they attack. In this way, we might change 
or rather intensify Bakhtin’s definition for Regan and Gonerill, who do 
not close down, but close in on “the represented world and 
represented people.” As illustrated by Regan and Gonerill’s 
incremental reduction to Lear’s attendants, this intensified monologic 
behavior contracts. In this way, not only do the sisters reject Buber’s I-
Thou relationship, but in a monstrous exaggeration of the I-It 
connection, they attack the world.  
Through various tricks of language—forgeries, lies, 
manipulations—this reductively monologic nature aims to entrap the 
other: “[in the] life of the personality, monologue divides, while 
dialogue makes whole; monologue enslaves, while dialogue liberates” 
(Patterson 52). We have seen the contrasting tendency of the dialogue 
to seek freedom in the dialogic or multiple possibilities in the mask. 
This entrapping tendency of the monologue is clearly expressed 
throughout the Lear text. Moreover, the image of entrapment is 
certainly not suggestive and abstract—a mere notion of monologic 
constriction—but is blatant and concrete. Its images are pushed to the 
very forefront of the text and, from this apparently superficial position, 
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 take on particular meaning. One must pay attention, then, to the 
surface of the drama for, paradoxically, what the text may conceal. 
Indeed, like the mask, the text hides everything on the surface. Thus, 
in the very literal images of constriction and enslavement, the deeper 
issues of inner entrapment are revealed. The image of constriction is 
made plain, and is first seen when Cornwall and Regan, monologic 
counterparts, order Kent, the masked dialogist, to be bound in the 
stocks:   
 CORNWALL.   Fetch forth the stocks! 
    You stubborn, ancient knave, you reverend braggart, 
    We’ll teach you. 
 KENT.    Sir, I am too old to learn; 
   Call not your stocks for me. I serve the king, 
   On whose employment I was sent to you. 
   You shall do small respects, show too bold malice 
   Against the grace and person of my master, 
   Stocking his messenger. 
 CORNWALL.   Fetch forth the stocks! 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
        [Kent is put in the stocks] (2.2.114-121) 
 
Having trapped Kent in the stocks, the paring monologists repeat the 
pattern with Gloucester. Interestingly, these aggressive characters 
always work together as a team in seeking out the isolated. This 
predatory behavior reflects human perceptions of wolves hunting in a 
pack. Among the many animal names he calls Gonerill, Lear accuses 
her of having a “wolvish visage” (1.4.263). Thus, it is no surprise that 
Gloucester, alone, is cornered by Regan, Cornwall, and their servants, 
who seek to capture him:   
     Enter GLOUCESTER and Servants 
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 CORNWALL.   Who’s there — the traitor? 
 REGAN.  Ingrateful fox! ’tis he. 
 CORNWALL.  Bind fast his corky arms. 
 GLOUCESTER.  What means your graces? Good my friends, consider 
   You are my guests. Do me no foul play, friends. 
 CORNWALL.  Bind him, I say. 
 REGAN.            Hard, hard! O filthy traitor! 
 GLOUCESTER.  Unmerciful lady as you are, I’m none. 
 CORNWALL.  To this chair bind him.  (3.7.27-34 emphasis added) 
 
The enslaving tendencies of the monologists are patent in the Lear text 
in which stocking and binding are prominent events. In an illuminating 
transference, Regan uses the pejorative term hard to insult Gloucester. 
Only the non-fools, though, manifest this quality in their actions that 
entrap, bind, and maim. 
But this type of enslavement cannot stop at the original victim, and 
in the end the monologue enslaves itself. Indeed, from the evidence of 
Regan’s murder and then Gonerill’s suicide, the pattern of constriction 
intensifies to the point of implosion or self-annihilation: 
Losing contact with word of the other, which is indispensable to 
dialogue, the character reaches a position where he cannot do 
other than what the monologic voice requires; thus becoming the 
plaything of compulsion, he dies in one form or another. The I-
for-myself loses the I-for-the-other, loses the dialogical relation, 
and finally loses itself. (Patterson 52). 
 
Gonerill and Regan in the end “lose themselves.” And while these 
sisters at no point live for the other, in the beginning of the play they 
at least support each other, even if the alliance is strategically 
contingent. Eventually, though, they must turn on each other, each 
vying for the favour of Edmond, who deceives and uses them both. 
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 When Edmond hears of the sisters’ deaths, he admits that he “was 
contracted to them both” (5.3.202). And with their deaths, Edmond 
articulates, “all three / Now marry in an instant” (5.3.202-3). 
   Gonerill’s suicide is rarely regretted by critics, if at all. Yet, as a 
significant action in the play, her death deserves reflection. There is no 
avoiding Gonerill’s wretched attacks on her own kin, but she is 
certainly one of, if not the, most abused character, for she is abused 
from within, to the point that she kills herself. And, in a play that 
seems to be so interiorly focused, suicide is the darkest manifestation 
of a damaged inner world: 
 EDGAR.  What means this bloodly knife? 
 GENTLEMAN.                    ’Tis hot, it smokes. 
   It came even from the heart of — O, she’s dead. 
 ALBANY.  Who dead? Speak, man. 
 GENTLEMAN.  Your lady, sir, your lady; and her sister 
   By her is poisoned: she confesses it. (5.3.197-201) 
 
Gonerill’s suicide, not Cordelia’s or any other death, is arguably the 
most regrettable event in the whole play. There is no mitigation in this 
death, even though Gonerill has been anything but just to her father 
and youngest sister. While no one can deny the drama’s painful ending 
with the deaths of Gloucester, Lear, and Cordelia, the state in which 
these characters die is significant. Cordelia dies in innocence and full 
of gratitude for her father’s transformation. Lear dies redeemed, 
having changed from a hot-tempered compulsive tyrant to a repentant 
man of sobriety with moral courage enough to ask for forgiveness. 
Gloucester dies in full knowledge that his repudiated, apparently lost 
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 son lives and loves him. These characters die, but not in suicidal 
darkness, the ultimate manifestation of madness, like Gonerill. 
Gloucester has Edgar to save him from his own destruction, and Lear 
has everyone else to help him face his folly. Gonerill, though, is more 
affected by madness than any other character, but has no way of 
realizing or escaping from it. Gonerill endures the greatest degree of 
confinement, therefore, for she has no folly to break open her 
madness. 
The acts of enslavement performed on Kent, on Gloucester, and 
finally on Gonerill herself in suicide, are manifestations of an 
underlying claustrophobia pervading the Lear text. Susan Snyder notes 
this claustrophobic atmosphere. For Snyder, constriction epitomizes 
the structure of the play, especially in Shakespeare’s unique use of the 
double plot. Usually the double plot, a distinctly comic device, permits 
the “audience to escape confinement within a single set of problems 
and relationships by shifting from one world to another—court to 
country, nobles to common folk” (141). In contrast, the plot of Lear 
raises one set of problems that would be confining in itself, but 
becomes all the more so for its emphasis on constriction. One would 
expect the Gloucester plot, then, to offer the much-needed escape 
from the prison of the Lear plot. Indeed, while the reader thinks that 
the Gloucester plot will “promise just this sort of variety . . . events 
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 bring the two plots into closer and closer symmetry,” and the freedom 
that typically results from the double plot is utterly diminished (141): 
[The similarities between the plots] is not to deny the differences 
of scale and emphasis between the Lear plot and the Gloucester 
one, but rather to recognize that the promise of escape was a 
trick. There is no contrasting realm of action which operates by 
rules different from Lear’s. By introducing a potential contrast and 
then dissolving it in dreadful parallelism, Shakespeare converts the 
double plot from its usual freeing function to the service of tragic 
claustrophobia. (141) 
 
The Gloucester plot closes a trap, and no freedom is offered there to 
the audience. This illusory attempt at freedom affirms the 
claustrophobia that lowers throughout. Indeed, the challenge of the 
fools, then, is to find freedom and breath within this foreshortened, 
toxic landscape. The fools must seek refuge in this imploding or 
coagulating landscape that would crush every character in monologic 
aggression; they need a barrier to prevent them from being 
compacted. It is the mask, in fact, that is this exact barrier, this refuge, 
this frustration of the in-turning world. The refuge of the mask serves 
not only as a space for any needed change and as an escape from the 
paring, but functions also like a pocket of oxygen in an otherwise 
breathless and uninhabitable landscape. The fools cannot merely 
escape from the converging world, for this is their country and their 
world. The fools cannot leave; they need to find freedom within it, 
which freedom is exactly what Kent points out. 
Freedom within the mask is what Kent alludes to when he 
discloses his plans to enter into a disguise. After Kent is banished, he 
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 tells everyone that he will leave England and travel to a new country: 
“Thus, Kent, O princes, bids you all adieu, / He’ll shape his old course 
in a country new” (1.1.180-1). We know, however, that Kent does not, 
in fact, travel to another country. Instead, he stays where he is, but 
assumes the disguise of a madman, Caius. Putting on a disguise is 
thus equated to travelling to a new country, which association 
reaffirms the notion of the mask as journey. Kent contributes to this 
notion by adding the attribute of freedom within the mask: “Freedom 
lives hence [in the new country—inside the mask], and banishment is 
here [without the mask]” (1.1.175). For Kent, the mask is important not 
as a means of transformation, but as a means of keeping company 
with Lear, who had banished him from his company and from the 
country. Snyder disagrees: she argues that the mask does not provide 
Kent with freedom. He maintains the same role of servant instead of 
assuming a new one: “Kent becomes Caius in order to go on doing 
what he has been before. His servant role represents no radical change 
of outlook, and its freeing powers are correspondingly limited” (150). 
Kent, however, does not seek a “radical change of outlook,” but wishes 
simply to continue to “shape his old course.” The mask offers Kent the 
freedom he needs to fulfill his desire to serve. This freedom and 
breath is found, in fact, within the fool and within the mask, which 
uses its inner nothingness or emptiness or breath or potentiality, 
paradoxically, to withstand the pressure of the converging world. 
 74
 Despite external restriction, the mask provides the bearer with 
openness and inner freedom. Thus, Welsford’s romantic observation 
that the fool has the power to “melt the solidity of the world” (223; see 
page 65 above), needs to be clarified by Lear. The fools hardly succeed 
in melting the hard hearts of Regan and Gonerill. To prevent 
themselves from being crushed by their world, the fools must slip into 
the mask. 
If indeed an oppressive atmosphere dominates the Lear world and 
if the mask does function as an open space that hinders a total 
collapse, one would expect there to be an emphasis on security in 
interior spaces like the hovel. Indeed Shakespeare does stress the 
notion of moving inside, and becoming interior is an increasingly 
repeated theme. Pertinently, it is the Fool, the wielder and perpetual 
bearer of the mask, who inroduces this motif in the first Act. After Lear 
has blundered all he could, the Fool chides him for giving away his 
possessions. Lear turns out to be worse off than a snail, who at least 
has his shell in which to lay his head. Lear has given away even his 
shell, as it were, and has no outer barrier of protection: 
 FOOL.  Canst tell how an oyster makes his shell? 
 LEAR.  No. 
 FOOL.  Nor I either; but I can tell why a snail has a house. 
 LEAR.  Why? 
FOOL.  Why, to put ’s head in, not to give it away to his daughters, 
and leave    
   his horns without a case. (1.5.21-6) 
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 Sharing, by imputation the cuckold’s horns with the soft shell, Lear is 
unprotected and humiliated both physically and mentally, and is, thus, 
the greatest target of oppression. As one who has found freedom 
within the mask, Kent also stresses Lear’s need for a means of survival 
in the slowly collapsing landscape—a “case” or “house” in which to put 
his head. On the heath, Kent implores Lear repeatedly to find 
protection: 
    Alack, bare-headed? 
 Gracious my lord, hard by here is a hovel. 
 Some friendship will it lend you ’gainst the tempest. 
 Repose you there, while I to this hard house — 
 More harder than the stones whereof ’tis raised, 
 Which even but now, demanding after you, 
 Denied me to come in — return and force 
 Their scanted courtesy. (3.2.58-65) 
 
Kent persists with this theme of entering, even when Lear either 
disregards or does not hear him:  
 Here is the place, my lord. Good my lord, enter.  
The tyranny of the open night’s too rough  
For nature to endure. (3.4.1-3) 
 
Lear does not respond affirmatively, and so Kent repeats himself: 
“Good my lord, enter here” (3.4.4). Lear does not respond to Kent’s 
request but says pensively, “Wilt break my heart” (3.4.4), to which 
Edgar replies, “I had rather break mine own. Good my lord, enter” 
(3.4.5). Lear then releases his thoughts in a long speech directed to no 
one, and when he finally finishes, Kent repeats the familiar line: “Good 
my lord, enter here” (3.4.22). And, over one hundred and fifty lines 
later, after meeting with Edgar disguised as Poor Tom, Kent is still 
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 repeating the same plea: “Good my lord, take this offer; go into 
th’house” (3.4.140). The levels of meaning behind Kent’s simple 
command “go in” are numerous indeed and this command takes on a 
more loaded significance with every repetition. The imperative 
embodies all that has been discussed concerning the mask above. By 
commanding Lear to “go in,” Kent also tells Lear to change, to seek 
protection, and to let his heart, the centre of the inner world, heal. 
This emphasis on interiority symbolizes the need to participate in a 
spiritual dimensions in life found “within.”  
The repeated “go in” speaks of the value of the inner life, which is 
accessible at any point in time. This perspective of interiority, 
moreover, helps us even to understand the deaths at the end that 
many critics find difficult to deal with. Issues of injustice besiege 
Cordelia’s death. We find her death so incomprehensible because her 
purity, innocence, and goodness do not merit such a harsh end that 
could have easily been prevented. The contrast between the horrible 
outward event and Cordelia’s inner world is immense, a contrast that 
forces one to look at the inner/outer dichotomy: 
The force of the impression [of Cordelia’s death] . . . depends on 
the very violence of the contrast between the outward and the 
inward, Cordelia’s death and Cordelia’s soul. The more 
unmotivated, unmerited, senseless, monstrous, her fate, the more 
do we feel that it does not concern her. The extremity of the 
disproportion between propensity and goodness first shocks us, 
and then flashes on us the conviction that our whole attitude is 
asking or expecting that goodness should be prosperous is wrong; 
that, if only we could see things as they are, we should see that 
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 the outward is nothing and the inward is all. (Bradley 325-6 
emphasis added) 
 
Bradley adds that “some such thought as this . . . is really present 
through the whole play” (326). Here we find the great contrast between 
the real and the ideal, which ideal reality, Bradley seems to imply, 
might be more real and more meaningful than reality itself. The critical 
focus, therefore, determines one’s stance on the play’s final events. 
John Reibetanz notes that part of our reaction to the play stems from 
our preference for either reality or ideality: 
We protest so strongly against Cordelia’s death because we are not 
of her world (nor is Lear, try as he does to reach it): we cannot, in 
fact, value virtue more than life, although we can look up to such a 
value as an ideal. We are more like Edgar, who compromises and 
clings to life. (122) 
 
In the tension between real and ideal worlds, Reibetanz holds that 
most readers and critics identify with reality over ideality. Samuel 
Johnson’s well-known opinion might be said to arise from a 
predisposition for real or external events over the ideal or inner ones: 
And, if my sensations could add anything to the general suffrage, I 
might relate that I was many years ago so shocked by Cordelia’s 
death, that I know not whether I ever endured to read again the 
last scenes of the play till I undertook to revise them as an editor. 
(3) 
 
Like Johnson, Nahum Tate focuses on the play’s exterior. Tate’s 
inspiration to change the ending is derived from reflection on outward 
events, although not even he can restore Lear to the throne. Bradley, 
on the contrary, focuses on the interior events, and goes so far as to 
say that the “inward is all.” But the inward bounty of the play is 
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 understated, to say the least, beside the much more accessible 
darkness. Lear’s inner richness and virtue has to be sought by the 
reader. In this way, King Lear itself becomes a Silenus figure that 
renders its inner beauty difficult of access within the harsh 
presentation of the events. 
An inner ideal that is maintained behind a rough surface returns 
us to Socrates and Silenus. Yet, Alcibiades compares Socrates not just 
to Silenus but also to a satyr, Marsyas. It is worthwhile, therefore, to 
consider this specific satyr, as well as the nature of the satyr in 
general. According to myth, Marsyas was a talented satyr who found a 
flute discarded by Athena. After experimenting with the instrument, he 
discovered that he had talent enough to play, even excellently. Marsyas 
could play so well, in fact, that he challenged Apollo, the god of music, 
to a competition. Not surprisingly, Marsyas lost the competition, and, 
for his presumption, he was flayed to death. It is easy to see how 
Alcibiades might use the myth to accuse Socrates of excess or hubris, 
“[p]resumption, orig. towards the gods; pride, excessive self-
confidence” (OED). The fool as we have seen does overstep or exceed 
limits on every level—religious, political, social—yet he does not do 
this out of pride, but out of obedience. In the myth of Marsyas, the 
connection between the fool and music is again reaffirmed. Marsyas, 
or Socrates the fool, like Lear’s Fool in Kozintsev’s film version of Lear, 
is a musician. But Socrates surpasses even Marsyas’ abilities, because 
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 Marsyas needs an instrument to charm people, whereas Socrates, 
Alcibiades tells us, needs only words:   
And you’re quite a flute-player, aren’t you? In fact, you’re much 
more marvelous than Marsyas, who needed instruments to cast his 
spells on people . . . The only difference between you and Marsyas 
is that you need no instruments; you do exactly what he does, but 
with words alone. (215C-215D) 
 
While the Fool does not necessarily have the same spellbinding effect 
on his company as Socrates, he nevertheless possesses the same gift 
of doubled language. Both Socrates and the Fool speak about 
apparently insignificant things and topics, but their words are loaded 
with meaning. The meaning, intensity, and charge behind these similar 
façades of banality infuse their words with a sense of musicality. The 
potency of their speech shines through the commonplace talk, and 
seems to issue from an ideal source within. 
 There is hardly a more concise or influential rendering of the 
nature and continuance of this inner ideal than Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
study of the satyr chorus in his first major work, The Birth of Tragedy. 
Nietzsche’s study of the satyr chorus is important, even necessary for 
any study of the fool, for as Thelma Niklaus states, it “seems probable 
that all mimes, clowns, drolls, and mummers known to Europe were 
engendered by the Satyr of the Greek Old Comedy” (qtd. in Willeford 
11). Like the “idyllic shepherd of more recent times,” the satyr is the 
“offspring of a longing for the primitive and the natural” (Nietzsche 
61). He thus embodied this ideal reality:  
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 It is indeed an “ideal” domain, as Schiller correctly perceived, in 
which the Greek satyr chorus, the chorus of primitive tragedy, was 
wont to dwell. It is a domain raised high above the actual paths of 
mortals. (58) 
 
Fictitious as they were, these wood-dwelling creatures still represented 
the archetype, that is, the ideal, of the human being, with its intensity 
and capacity for emotion and life in general. The satyr’s closeness to 
nature was a source of his fervour, and he embraced even the terrible 
aspects of the forest, thus embodying the archetypal nature of the 
human: 
The satyr was the archetype of man, the embodiment of his 
highest and most intense emotions, the ecstatic reveler enraptured 
by the proximity of his god, the sympathetic companion in whom 
the suffering of the god is repeated, one who proclaims wisdom 
from the very heart of nature. (61) 
 
It is difficult at this point not to think of the Fool as indeed the 
“sympathetic companion in whom the suffering of [his master] is 
repeated,” and of Lear as a distant echo of the god Dionysus, the 
satyr’s god and the god of wine and nature who is depicted wearing a 
crown of laurels, especially when we see Lear “crowned with weeds and 
flowers” (4.6.80 s.d.).* Though this allusion remains authentic and 
present at a distance, it breaks down with a closer view. The analogy 
fails when Nietzsche resolves several common misunderstandings of 
the satyr chorus. 
 Nietzsche argues forcefully about the critical misinterpretation of 
the function of the chorus. While Nietzsche admits that it is popular to 
view the chorus as an “ideal spectator” of the tragic action, this view is 
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 not consistent with the tradition of the chorus and with the origin of 
tragedy. Nietzsche states that this “tradition tells us quite 
unequivocally that tragedy arose from the tragic chorus, and was 
originally only chorus and nothing but chorus” (56 emphasis added). 
This emphasis changes the importance of the chorus and the 
perception of the tragedy, for the chorus that is commonly seen as 
taking a sideline role is now placed in the forefront. But what does 
Nietzsche mean when he claims that tragedy arose from the tragic 
chorus? He explains that the action proper of the tragedy was 
“basically and originally thought of merely as a vision; the chorus is 
the only ‘reality’ and generates the vision, speaking of it with the 
entire symbolism of dance, tone, and words” (65).1 In other words, in 
the beginning of tragedy, the action proper was the satyr chorus, the 
fool’s ancestor, envisioning the drama of Dionysus. For this reason, 
Nietzsche states, it does not make sense to claim that the chorus’ 
main function is as spectator, for the “spectator without the spectacle 
is an absurd notion” (57). It is with this insight that the Fool/Lear—
Chorus/Dionysus match dissolves, for to carry the relationship further 
would mean that Lear himself is a vision of the Fool, and that the fools 
are the only realities in the play; the whole play would then have been 
dreamed up by the fools. 
                                                 
1 While Aristotle does not go so far as to say that the chorus envisions the tragedy, 
he holds that the chorus is nevertheless integral to the drama: “The chorus should be 
thought of as one of the actors; it should be a part of the whole and contribute its 
share to success” (Poetics 18 1456a 25-7). 
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  Nevertheless, Nietzsche is equally dissatisfied with the other 
popularly-accepted statement that the chorus’ main function was that 
of poetic license. It is not that Nietzsche denies the relevance of this 
characteristic, but suggests that it in no way encompasses the whole 
meaning of the chorus: it is “not sufficient that one merely tolerates as 
poetic license what is actually the essence of all poetry” (58). As the 
predecessor of the fool who is associated with the flute, the chorus is 
also associated with music—he is the “essence of all poetry.” Also, one 
immediately sees the similarities between the description of the 
chorus, and the commonly-held statements about the fool, who is also 
seen as both the ideal spectator and the all-licensed critic. Gonerill 
sneers, as we have seen, that Lear’s Fool is “all-licensed” (1.4.160). 
These notions contain pertinent insight. For example, the relevance of 
the all-licensed critic to Lear is great, especially in the context of its 
first recorded performance. King Lear was played for the first time in 
the English courts for King James I during the Christmas holidays, 
1606. It is easy to see how some of the Fool’s criticism directed at Lear 
could also have been aimed at the viewing King. The play indeed 
“touched on a number of sensitive issues” regarding British parliament 
(Halio 1), especially regarding the issue of the division of the kingdom. 
In his first parliament, King James “declared his intention of uniting the 
kingdoms of Scotland and England as one realm, Great Britain, 
restoring the ancient title and unity to the land” (1). Lear’s line, “Know, 
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 that we have divided / In three our kingdom,” (1.1.32-3) would indeed 
have made King James sit up. The notion of the all-licensed critic to 
the king bears upon these circumstances of performance and 
reception. It is nevertheless important, though, not to make this the 
ultimate meaning of the fool, whose ancestor, the satyr chorus, 
Nietzsche insists, “is actually the essence of all poetry.” One must 
include the notion of poetic license in one’s conception of the fool, 
and then continue to seek out a more encompassing meaning.  
 Nietzsche finds this deeper meaning in Friedrich Schiller’s preface 
to his play The Bride to Messina, and our understanding of the fool will 
benefit from Schiller’s image of the chorus: 
the chorus [is] a living wall that tragedy constructs around itself in 
order to close itself off from the world of reality and to preserve its 
ideal domain and poetical freedom. (58 emphasis added) 
 
One can hardly find a better definition of Lear’s Fool than Schiller’s of 
the tragic chorus: he “is a living wall.” And within this living wall exists 
an “ideal domain and poetical freedom.” Now the reader might ask: “is 
the fool the wall, which seems to be like the mask, or is he the content 
within the wall or mask?” This question cuts to the heart of the 
problem, and we shall answer: both. The wall is the mask of the fool, 
and within its shell the domain of the ideal may exist; but the ideal 
domain and the mask depend on each other. Without the wall, the 
boundary, no ideal domain can exist. Insofar as these integral aspects 
of the fool are co-dependent and inextricably linked, he is both. But 
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 the inner contents preserved behind this living border are both the 
fool and also that which transcends him. This is why Patterson declares 
that there is an “inner infinity behind the mask” (17). In asserting a 
definite border, the fool allows what is perhaps a transcendent reality 
to enter within. The Fool encourages one to dialogically “look inside” 
for an eternal world. Lear, so preoccupied with the fall, the division, 
and the collapse of the external kingdom, with its emphasis on “going 
in,” might indeed be pointing to an entirely new—inner—domain of 
sovereignty and government.  
 Moreover, this living wall does not imply any emotional 
remoteness from the world as is implied in Schiller’s definition, for the 
fool is involved in the world to a perfect degree (as Lear’s Fool 
demonstrates), while he maintains an inner domain of the ideal.2 The 
Fool, like the chorus, suffers, and this wall does not isolate him from 
the emotional intensity of the world, but rather unites him to it. This 
wall—a mask really—does not create an illusory existence and does 
                                                 
2 Compare this to Erikson’s research on inversion theory, in which theory upside-
downings, carnival or otherwise, are interpreted as adult play. Erikson’s Spielraum 
emphasizes that during play a distinction is made between reality or that which is 
outside of play, and actuality, that which is inside of play:  
 
Erik Erikson and others suggest that its [adult play’s] function . . . allow[s] us to 
engage in “reversible operations” symbolic inversions create Spielraum, a space 
in which to take chances with new roles and ideas. Or as Erikson says, it permits 
us to infuse reality with actuality. He defines the terms as follows: “If reality is 
the structure of facts consensually agreed upon in a given stage of knowledge, 
actuality must always resist reality to remain truly playful . . . In adulthood an 
individual gains leeway for himself, as he creates it for others; here is the soul 
of adult play.” (Babcock 25)   
 
In his own context, Erikson describes perfectly the duty of the chorus, which is to 
keep, to Erikson’s terms, actuality in and reality out. 
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 not diminish truth; on the contrary, Nietzsche goes so far as to say 
that “it—the satyr chorus—represents existence more truthfully” (61). 
This is why Patterson writes that “masked truth is truth signified; the 
masks of God are the images of God” (Patterson 16). Signified truth, 
not naked truth, is what the fool conveys, but, as Patterson asserts, 
these masked significations are revelations of a divine reality on earth. 
The question of naked versus signified truth is ancient, and every age 
seems to sanction signified over plain truth. Socrates wears a mask. 
Christ speaks in parables. Fools in every age prove that “the masks of 
God are the images of God.” Specifically the mask of madness, 
moreover, as opposed to any other type of mask, becomes the highest 
revelation of God within humankind as revealed by Christ:  
Christ did not merely choose to be surrounded by lunatics; he 
himself chose to pass in their eyes for a madman, thus 
experiencing, in his incarnation, all the sufferings of human 
misfortune. Madness thus became the ultimate form, the final 
degree of God in man’s image, before the fulfillment and 
deliverance of the Cross. (Foucault 80) 
 
The mask of madness is the disguise of choice for all masking 
characters in Lear— Edgar, Kent, and Edmond—although not every 
character who shams a madman falls under the same definition. 
Edmond—best known for the intensity of his malice, ambition, and 
resourcefulness—also briefly and jocularly plays an alternate identity, 
whom he names Tom o’Bedlam: 
Pat: he [Edgar] comes, like the catastrophe of the old comedy. My 
cue is  
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    villainous melancholy, with a sigh like Tom o’Bedlam. – O these 
eclipses do  
   portend these divisions. Fa, so, la, me. (1.2.117-9) 
 
Like a Vice of the earlier English stage, humming a tritone (diabolus in 
musica), Edmond dons the mask cynically, even diabolically, to harm 
and betray others. Benevolent or malicious: the intentions behind the 
character’s assumption of a disguise are crucial. Edmond uses the 
mask to dupe his brother and father. Edgar uses it to save his father. 
Kent shams a madman to serve his master. Most characters in the play 
use the mask to serve not control. Madness then becomes a key aspect 
of the spiritual complexities in the play. For Foucault and Erasmus, it is 
the highest revelation of the divine on earth. Even in the Tarot, the 
madness embodied by the fool offers a key to comprehension: “it is 
with his madness, that of the Fool of God, that the cards are 
illuminated” (Bill Butler 110). The mask is important for two reasons: to 
signify truth; and, to protect the inner contents, life, and identity. To 
validate this mask or boundary Shakespeare repeatedly uses images of 
literal, material walls (i.e. egg shell, snail shell, hovel), which signify 
what is really an imperceptible (i.e. living) wall. That Shakespeare’s 
images are frail—an egg shell, a scanty shelter—and on the point of 
collapse does not detract from their relevance, but only emphasizes 
human weakness and poverty, insofar as the fool is the archetype of 
the human. 
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  The boundary of the mask becomes increasingly important when 
we realize that without it, the life-giving power of folly cannot 
succeed. When the sisters incrementally pare away Lear’s fortune and 
mind, they leave him stripped of everything. The Fool reflects on the 
misfortune of this event, and notes that even he, a poor fool, is better 
off than Lear, for he at least has a “figure,” a name, a role, in his case, 
a boundary or container that can include the entire universe: 
FOOL.   now thou art an O without a figure. I am better than 
thou  
   art now; I am a fool, thou art nothing. (1.4.152-153) 
 
The Fool is, therefore, not nothing, but something, which something, 
again, is the limit or boundary of the mask; however, within this 
something, the everything-nothing of the fool may exist. Lear does not 
even have this bound: his chaos matches the chaos in the external 
landscape; and without the mask, Lear is the antithesis of the Silenus 
figure in which beautiful forms reside behind a limit or mask. In the 
face of chaos upon chaos, the Fool is utterly disempowered. The fool 
needs an external boundary in order to introduce into this limit, the 
limitlessness of freedom, folly, and the ideal. The necessity of the 
boundary is rendered in an account of the role of the ancient Trickster 
figure: 
According to [Karl] Kerényi, the Trickster’s “function in an archaic 
society . . . is to add disorder to order so to make it whole, to 
render possible, within the fixed bounds of what is permitted, an 
experience of what is not permitted. (Willeford 132) 
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 While the fool is often seen as the spirit of disorder itself, he is 
dependant upon boundaries and limits in order to be effective. This is 
why the Fool is incapacitated in the face of Lear’s chaos, for how is the 
Fool supposed to create wholeness, to use Kerényi’s words, by adding 
disorder, if there is no order in the first place? In a chaotic universe the 
fool is impotent, and thus the Fool cannot change Lear’s upset spirit 
on the heath: try as he may, he cannot “out-jest / [Lear’s] heart-struck 
injuries” (3.1.8-9). Yet it is Lear’s reception and not the Fool’s delivery 
that renders the Fool’s labours ineffective. This landscape of chaos 
without boundaries is the heath, which is another reason why—in 
addition to symbolizing Lear’s inner transformation—Kent and the 
Fool, who embody the boundaries of the mask perfectly, are bent on 
getting Lear inside the shelter, and within the boundary. The necessity 
of this boundary as a means of freedom is seemingly paradoxical, for 
one typically imagines freedom as a space without boundaries. Thus, 
the notion of imprisonment has come full circle; the characters who 
need to escape from the imprisonment of the monologic non-fools, 
also need the personal limit of the mask in order to maintain inner 
freedom and the realm of the ideal. The full meaning of Foucault’s 
observations of the madman (the fool) is now apparent:  
He is a prisoner in the midst of what is the freest, the openest of 
routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger 
par excellence: that is, the prisoner of passage. (11) 
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 The intimate relationship between boundary (prison), freedom, and the 
ideal, is brought to the forefront in Act Five, when the living wall of 
Schiller becomes the ultimate limit—prison walls. 
 In one of the most potent images in the play, the vision of Lear 
and Cordelia in prison, Shakespeare epitomizes not only the inner 
ideal, but also the necessity of the boundary. When Lear speaks of 
entering the cell within prison, he does not do so with anxiety, which 
seems the more likely response, but with anticipation, for within this 
limit, Lear is certain of the ideal reality that will open up. When he 
describes the life that he and Cordelia will share, Lear uses this 
language of the ideal that contains elements of a paradisal reality. Lear 
speaks of many things in nature: butterflies; birds, the moon. He tells 
Cordelia that they will sing and converse joyously together: 
 CORDELIA.  Shall we not see these daughters and these sisters? 
 LEAR.  No, no, no, no! Come, let’s away to prison. 
    We two alone will sing like birds i’th’cage. 
    When thou dost ask me blessing, I’ll kneel down 
    And ask of thee forgiveness: so we’ll live, 
    And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
    At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
    Talk of court news, and we’ll talk with them too— 
    Who loses and who wins; who’s in, who’s out— 
    And take upon ’s the mystery of things. 
    As if we were God’s spies; and we’ll wear out 
    In a walled prison packs and sects of great ones 
    That ebb and flow by th’moon. (5.3.7-19) 
 
The language and images within Lear’s vision correspond with Frye’s 
green world, a realm or sphere in Shakespeare’s plays that still recalls 
something of a paradisal world: 
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 The forest or the green world, then, is a symbol of natural society . 
. . the “golden world” he is trying to regain. This natural society is 
associated with things which in the context of the ordinary world 
seem unnatural, but which are in fact attributes of nature as a 
miraculous and irresistible reviving power. These associations 
include dream, magic, and chastity or spiritual energy as well as 
fertility and renewed natural energies. (Natural 142-3) 
 
The “golden world” or the green world Frye describes also depicts the 
world within Lear’s vision of the prison, but with a difference—here the 
greenness flourishes in a walled prison. 
 This mask-like image of the sustaining, protecting prison depicts 
the invisible or living reality within the personal limit, even though 
from Edmond’s increasingly monologic perspective the cell is to be a 
place of execution. These notions must be separated when studying 
the scene, for otherwise a distorted interpretation of a real political 
prison will result. Present circumstances in the world, to say nothing of 
the events during the last century, are too close for the image of a 
political prison to provoke no response in the reader. It would be 
monstrous to argue that within the limits of the Gulag and other 
abominable human creations, a paradisal landscape opened—far from 
it. Individuals of courage and spirit were able to convert this 
experience into testimonies from which humanity can forever benefit, 
but one would never seek these for a gateway to paradise. Indeed Lear 
and Cordelia never make it into this paradisal cell, and Cordelia dies 
soon after Lear’s vision. Such reflection brings to the foreground one 
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 of the main questions of the play: do the real circumstances negate the 
ideal?   
 Some critics certainly think so, and go so far as to say that Lear is 
anti-ideal, or an anti-pastoral. Ronald Miller believes that Lear is an 
anti-pastoral because the places in nature, the heath for example, are 
full of darkness and uncertainty and lack the light and hopeful 
atmosphere of the pastoral: 
The pastoral landscape becomes the dark night on the heath, 
rustic simplicity becomes nakedness and squalor, the jokes of the 
fool become searing insights, and the evil children turn out to be 
not the petty, malicious stepdaughters of Cinderella nor such 
easily thwarted siblings as Oliver and Don John, but Goneril and 
Regan, who shut their father out to die in the storm, and Edmund, 
who for advancement gives his father over to torture before 
ordering his death. (15) 
 
Maynard Mack certainly shares this view and even declares that King 
Lear is the “greatest anti-pastoral ever penned” (65). Mack and Miller’s 
observations offer an accurate reading of the play’s exterior; these 
critics, like Johnson and Tate, are looking on the outside of the play’s 
Silenus mask. But the overreaching presence of this dark, corrupt 
world does not negate an alternate, ideal world; nothing is excluded—
these worlds co-exist. Thus, Lear’s vision of the ideal world 
demonstrates that Lear is not an anti-pastoral, and that the green 
world still exists. Resituated, though, the green world is not at first 
recognizable. On the face of the Lear world, there is no Arden of 
brightly lit gardens, forests, or meadows; there are certainly no 
messages on trees. And the dramatic atmosphere is certainly not 
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 benign, mysterious, or inviting. Yet there is a green world, but it is, for 
the first time, found only within the characters. Therefore, Lear cannot 
be seen as an anti-pastoral; but it is, rather, for the first time in 
Shakespeare, an inner-pastoral. And in order to find this inner-
pastoral, the reader must approach King Lear like a Silenus statue, and 
not take it for what it seems to be, but for what it is behind the mask. 
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The Fool reads King Lear 
 
 
 The mask begins as a static image, a container in which the 
everything-nothing of the fool, who is analogous to the mask for 
etymological and conceptual reasons, may be encapsulated. The image 
of the mask quickly gains dynamism when we learn that entering into 
the mask may be akin to embarking on a journey, to descending into 
and returning from the underworld, like Orpheus with his descent. In 
Lear, the journey of the mask takes the form of sailing, which is 
appropriate considering the popularity of the image of the ship in the 
Renaissance imagination. Brant’s Narrenschiff was published in 1494, 
and a host of other works in which the image of sailing took centre 
stage was also published around this time. No literal ship, however, 
appears in Lear, and the presence of the sailing/journey image is 
found actually in the storm scene in which the hovel itself becomes 
associated with a ship. Edgar’s line, “Fathom and half” (3.4.37), a 
sailor’s cry, connects the hovel to the ship. Its dimensions—its explicit 
inner and outer spheres—juxtaposed, the hovel becomes a 
hyperbolized image of the mask. Since the hovel takes on the image of 
 93
 the mask, and since Edgar connects the small shelter with a ship, the 
mask, therefore, becomes associated with sailing, with the journey, 
which unites it to an enduring pattern in literature, that of movement 
and return. The outcome of the voyage is metamorphosis. That the 
mask entails metamorphosis is pertinent to Lear in which 
transformation, exemplified in Lear’s conversion from wealthy king, to 
homeless madman, to repentant father, is the principal event.  
 Though Lear’s madness is akin to entering into the mask, it is not 
just an assumption of a protective layer of signification, but is 
authentic through and through. The process of transformation, 
though, is one and the same for madness and the mask, but only 
under the correct conditions, for madness is two-fold. Erasmus has 
distinguished between foolish and wise madness. Those who are mad 
in the foolish sense need leadership and guidance from those who 
embody wise madness or folly. Lear’s and Gloucester’s connectedness 
to those who possess wise folly is what saves them from the ultimate 
act of madness, suicide, and leads them to safety, even redemption. 
Wisdom saves both desperate men from self-destruction. Gonerill, 
unlike Lear and Gloucester, is not connected to, or, rather, avidly 
rejects, those who might lead her to inner metamorphosis. Alone in 
her tent, Gonerill epitomizes the mad character in her suicidal act. This 
impulse of self-annihilation, which is really a movement of implosion, 
opposes the outward, expansive movement of the fools, the mask-
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 wearers. From the tyrannical Lear on down to the opportunistic 
Oswald, the non-fools limit and extinguish the freedom of the fools, 
an oppression that accounts for the claustrophobic atmosphere 
pervading the tragedy. To preserve the fragments and remnants of 
freedom in the collapsing dramatic landscape, the fools adopt the 
mask, behind which inner freedom is found. Thus, in addition to its 
potentially transformative effects, the mask also serves as a protective 
barrier from those who threaten the fools’ freedom from the outside. 
 It has been suggested that a final reason for the mask in Lear is 
that behind it, an “inner infinity” (see page 84 above), or even a 
transcendent reality may open up. This inner sphere that touches an 
eternal reality has been compared to Frye’s notion of the green world. 
Lear, therefore, is not an anti-pastoral, as Mack suggests, but an 
inner-pastoral. All of the attributes of the green world have shifted 
locations; that is, the green world no longer exists as an alternative 
external landscape, as is typical in Shakespearean comedy, but exists 
now solely within the characters. The combination of the complete 
devastation of Lear’s external world, and the play’s insistent motif of 
“going in” suggests that a new “kingdom” or dominion must be sought 
within. The image that most suggests the reality of the inner-pastoral 
is Lear’s vision of a prison cell in which a paradisal landscape 
flourishes. The prison wall suggests the boundary of the mask. The 
periphery that is the mask is related to Schiller’s image of the satyr 
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 chorus, which the Romantic poet depicts as a living wall in which an 
ideal reality is protected and maintained. But what exactly is this ideal 
reality within?   
There is one thing more to say. Earlier in this discussion, the need 
for a “dialectical marriage between cognitive load and form” was 
asserted (see page 2 above). The fool, as we have seen, unites the 
comic and tragic forms in the most unique way, and thus creates a new 
genre that is mobile, dynamic, and transformative. And yet, the 
cognitive load, which refers to the spiritual complexities of the play, 
has been hinted at but not yet fully delineated. To do so necessitates a 
return to Plato and the Symposium for one response to the spiritual 
complexities in Lear. 
Indeed, there is one vital thing more to be known about Socrates, 
the exemplar of our dialectical marriage. We know that foremost 
Socrates is a fool, but what else does Plato reveal about his 
personality?  Socrates denies that he possesses any wisdom (he only 
knows that he knows nothing), and yet Plato shows how, of all the 
many areas in which one could gain expertise—medicine, rhetoric, 
philosophy—Socrates asserts knowledge only in a single area: love, or, 
rather, the art of love. When Eryximachus proposes that, instead of 
getting drunk, each guest “give as good a speech in praise of Love as 
he is capable of giving” (177D), Socrates cannot help but accede to the 
proposal, for love is all he knows:  
 96
 “No one will vote against that, Eryximachus,” said Socrates. “How 
could I vote ‘No,’ when the only thing I say I understand is the art 
of love? Could Agathon and Pausanias? Could Aristophanes, who 
thinks of nothing but Dionysus and Aphrodite? No one I can see 
here now could vote against your proposal.” (177E) 
 
Socrates is not only a fool, but he is a fool who loves. What is this 
strange connection between the fool and love? It is made again by the 
Anonymous Hermeticist, who discerns a striking esoteric union 
between love and the fool. That author recounts his affiliation in youth 
in pre-Revolutionary Russia with an intellectual group, from whom he 
learns that “the Arcanum ‘The Fool’ corresponds to the letter Shin and 
that consequently its number is twenty-one, and its esoteric name is 
Love” (591). The author outlines how this striking conclusion is 
reached: 
For example, one meditated on the twenty-two letters of the 
Hebrew alphabet, in order to derive their Cabbalistic meaning, in 
the light of the twenty-two Major Arcana of the Tarot. And one 
came to the conclusion that each letter of the Hebrew alphabet –
understood Cabbalistically—corresponds to a particular Major 
Arcana of the Tarot. Now, it is the letter Shin . . . the twenty-first 
letter of the Hebrew alphabet, which was attributed  to the 
Arcanum “The Fool”. It was said that this is the letter of the 
Arcanum “The Fool”. And confidently it was added that the esoteric 
name of the Arcanum “The Fool” is AMOR (Love). (591) 
 
This conclusion opposes most readings of the Tarot, for zero, not 
twenty-one commonly is attributed to the fool. But this author’s 
preference deserves attention as an indicative insight: the fool bears 
the number zero insofar as he is the container in which nothing equals 
everything, or the ideal; and he is twenty-one insofar as love initiates, 
illuminates, and fulfils that ideal which he contains.   
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 Could love that is found in the fool be the “cognitive load” of the 
dialectal marriage? Could the fools be deployed in such striking 
numbers in the play to compensate for its unparalleled hatefulness, 
since they are actually bearers of something just the opposite—love? 
The king certainly demonstrates this possibility. Once his “wits . . . 
turn” (3.2.65) and he enters into folly, he suddenly feels a poignant 
concern: “How dost, my boy? Art cold?” (3.2.66). This is a marked 
change, for Lear, upon becoming a fool, no longer reasons his own 
needs, but the needs of others. Cordelia’s unfailing loyalty to and 
compassion for her father despite any disgrace or hurt is indeed 
other-worldly in virtue, tenderness, and filial love. And Kent and 
Edgar’s equal dedication to those who have hurt them most and their 
unwavering commitment despite any harsh conditions provide a 
testament to the unbreakability of love and friendship. Even the final 
change in Edmond, who admits his wrongdoing, is striking. Edmond 
has never been considered among the company of fools, but he does 
in the end admit his crimes and wish to support those who he has for 
so long opposed. After hearing Edgar speak about his father’s death, 
Edmond softens: “This speech of yours hath moved me, / And shall 
perchance do good” (5.3.190-1). Indeed, after one recovers from the 
shock of the abrupt ending, the darkness is not what one remembers, 
for malice and treachery are not new; there is nothing novel about 
murder and betrayal. What are unfailingly novel and worthy of 
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 remembrance are the forgiveness of Cordelia, the transformations of 
Lear, Albany, and even Edmond, and the love between Kent, Edgar, 
Gloucester, Lear, Cordelia, and the Fool. But how are we to understand 
this ideal in light of the multiple deaths that shape the ending? 
The Anonymous Hermeticist reflects on the relationship between 
love and life/death, or being, when he asks himself: “Does love 
therefore surpass being?” (34). John Reibetanz insists that “we cannot, 
in fact, value virtue [love] more than life [being], although we can look 
up to such a value as an ideal” (122). But the fool does not look “to 
such virtue as an ideal” but lives this reality, which is love: 
Does love therefore surpass being? How can one doubt this after 
the revelation of this truth through the nineteen centuries by the 
Mystery of Calvary? . . . and is not the sacrifice of His life, His 
terrestrial being, accomplished through love by God Incarnate, is 
this not the demonstration of the superiority of love over being? 
And is not the Resurrection the demonstration of the other aspect 
of the primacy of love over being, i.e. that love is not only superior 
to being but also that it engenders and restores it? (Meditations 
34) 
 
This conclusion is relevant to Lear, for in no other play is the tension 
between these realities so apparent. The awfulness of the crimes is 
juxtaposed with perfect sublimity. The play’s abundant external 
darkness necessitates that the landscape, in order to prevent a total 
collapse and corruption, has to, to use M. Willson Disher’s words, 
“hatch [more than one] clown from a clod” (34).   
The priority of love over being is suggested also in the same 
pertinent scene in the Symposium. In the initial look at the scene in 
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 question, Agathon and Aristophanes were, for obvious reasons, seen 
to represent their respective genres. How else, though, might we view 
these figures? First, if Aristophanes represents the comic genre, can we 
not also say life, for is not the comic concerned with the continuance 
and multiplication of a society and its growth? And if Agathon 
represents the tragedy genre, can we not also call this death, for does 
not the tragic genre perpetuate a pattern of downfall and eventual 
death of one or more figures? In their unresolvable balance, these 
figures might also be seen to represent being itself, and that which is 
temporal. And thus, when Socrates endures the night, while all others 
fall asleep, he shows more than just the unification of genres into the 
fool; he shows the endurance of love over being. The fool, who is love, 
unites what is best of all religions within his border or mask, and thus 
he contains, in a concentrated form, the highest ideal possible. Ideal 
existence in love is what is meant by the paradisal or ideal world. The 
fool becomes the dialectical marriage between the conflicting 
components of genre and religious identification in King Lear. One 
might easily combine these notions and assert that the fool recreates 
the problems of genre and content, and makes the content into the 
form. The fool, then, embodies what might be called a genre of love. 
Love, therefore, is the final and most important reason for the fool’s 
multitudinous presence in King Lear. With this in mind, the madness 
so central to the play is illuminated, for madness and love, and 
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 madness caused by love, are found in literature in every age. At this 
point, one could easily turn from Plato’s Symposium to the Phaedrus in 
order to illuminate the intimacy between madness and love in the fool: 
“in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness” 
(Phaedrus 244B). This greatest of blessings is what the fool possesses 
in his innermost forum: love, which Socrates and Christ tell us, 
survives death; this is what is worthy of remembrance in King Lear, 
and indeed, what survives every character who in death “falls asleep.” 
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